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The agony rending Vietnam is similar to many facted gem: light from
divergent sources is refracted and reflected in different directions re-
inforcing in some and destructively interfering in others, causing the
gem to flash and sparkle with relatively dull spots in between. The war in
Vietnam refracts and reflects ideas and issues in such a manner. Each of
the participants— the United States, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) , National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) , the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (DRV)—will view the struggle and the issues with different perspec-
tives modified by respective social norms. Vietnam is an ideological, tact-
tical and strategic refracting lense giving all viewers a different impres-
sion of the facts or "truth" since they will view the phenomenon from
divergent angles. This already confused scene is further distorted with the
views held by the major allies and supporters of the belligerents, in
particular, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic (CPR).
Through the resulting shadows the United States must thread its way towards
the ultimate objective of "peace." Where is the route to this seemingly
remote and almost unattainable goal and is it possible for us as a nation
to traverse that path? The United States has proclaimed it is for self-
determination without coercion from external forces. Yet even while the
United States was declaring for these noble principles, the Republic of
Vietnam was jailing dissenters within that country.
Is the defense of the Republic of Vietnam against an insurgency led
by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and an external
aggression mounted by the People's Army of Vietnam in the national interest
of the United States? Would a US withdrawal from Vietnam, leaving the war
to the Vietnamese to settle among themselves, have major, perhaps
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destabilizing, repercussion throughout the world reflecting on the credi-
bility of the United States' determination to back, with armed strength if
necessary, commitments to other nations? What is the meaning of "National
Honor" and is it central to a nation's survival and in particular is it
vital to the survival of the United States? Would the success of a war of
national liberation in Vietnam serve as a stimulus to dissident groups in
other countries to resolve their grievances through insurrection? Would
such a victory encourage the DRV, CPR, or USSR to use this type of warfare
as a vehicle to expand their control into new spheres with the resulting
increased probability of a direct US-USSR or US-CPR conflict of interest?
These are some of the questions which I consider central to the reso-
lution of the Vietnam problem. To a greater or lesser degree all of these
are directly tied to the US position in Vietnam. It is unlikely that suc-
cessive Administrations would have squandered so much national treasure,
blood and political capital on such an esoteric goal as self-determination.
If that was the only reason for US presence why are we not fighting in
Rhodesia, South Africa, Czechoslovakia, or a score of similar centers of
injustice or totalitarianism? Concepts such as Honor, Duty, National
Interest, Victory and Defeat are compelling. Therefore, unless militarily
defeated, a nation must convince itself before embarking on any policy that
its National Interest and Honor are best served by that policy without
prejudice to the Nation's Duty to its own citizens and friendly powers.
Viewed in this context, self-determination in Vietnam could conceivably be
considered by the US as Victory because the Enemy will have been Defeated
in his effort to destroy by force of arms the government we have assumed
the Duty to defend and therefore our Honor will have been preserved. On
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the other hand self-determination might be viewed as a defeat for the NLF
since it is unlikely that the NLF's political base is equal to its military
capability.
If Vietnam is a zero-sum gain situation then a US Victory must be
accompanied by a DRV/NLF Defeat. Since neither the US/RVN or the DRV/NLF
have been defeated on the battlefield, any victory would require one side
to acquiesce at the conference table to a defeat as yet unsustained in
combat which would clearly not be in any nation's National Interest. There-
fore, any solution to this complicated situation must necessarily involve
some self-deception by all parties; each convincing itself of two facts.
First, its Enemy had not achieved Victory. Second, if it had not achieved
a Victory at the expense of the Enemy neither had a Defeat been sustained
even if minimum war objectives may have been compromised.

IRISE OF THE PHOENIX
The roots of the present conflict in Vietnam lie buried in the settle-
ment to the previous war in Indochina, the so called First Indochina War.
By the Spring of 1954 the armed forces of the rebellious Democratic Republic
of Vietnam, then known as the Vietminh, had wrested the offensive from the
French Union Forces in the main theatre of combat operations, Tonkin.
Attacking French positions in the highlands on the periphery of the Red
River Delta the Vietminh commander, General Nguyen Vo Giap, had forced the
French Union Forces to become so dispersed trying to hold all positions that
they were unable to launch any serious counter offensives to break the
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Vietminh strangle hold in the country side. An attempt to regain the
offensive and lure the main force Vietminh formations into a set battle
where they would, in theory, be destroyed by superior French firepower was
made in the beginning of 1954 by the new French commander in Indochina,
General Henri Navarre. He devised the now famous Navarre Plan. The Plan
called for the establishment of air heads deep in Vietminh territory
athwart the Vietminh lines of communications. Giap would then be forced to
fight in order to maintain these lines of communications. When the fight
developed, a highly mobile reserve held in the Red River Delta would be com-
3
mitted and the Vietminh would be destroyed. The first of these air heads
was established at Diem Bien Phu in February 1954.
B. B. Fall and M. G. Raskin, The Vietnam Reader : Articles and Docu-
ments on American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Crisis (New York, N.Y.
:
Vintage Books, 1965) p. 82.
2
B. B. Fall, The Two Vietnams (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1967) pp. 114-
122.
3
General Henri Navarre, L*Agonie de l'Indochine (Paris: L' Editions de
Paris, 1958) pp. 151-164.

As Navarre's plan was launched Britain, France, the United States and
the USSR agreed to an international conference to be held in Geneva in
4
April to discuss the problems in both Korea and Indochina. This French
decision to investigate a negotiated settlement to the eight-year-old-war
seemed to have been a signal to Giap to improve the DRV's negotiating
position. Stepping up the raids along the edge of the Red River Delta,
Giap forced Navarre to commit his counter-offensive reserve piecemeal to
the defense of the Delta. When the Vietminh assault on Diem Bien Phu came,
instead of having a mobile reserve of 27 battalions, the French Union
reserve had swindled to 10. With insufficient reserves and limited air power,
the French garrison was unable to cope with the massed Vietminh artillary
and infantry. The battle for Diem Bien Phu was thus over almost before it
began. Instead of the French Union Forces destroying the Vietminh in a set
battle with superior fire power it was they who were about to be destroyed
by superior fire power.
Across the Pacific even as the Vietminh seemed on the verge of a
victory of unprecedented magnitude ominous storm clouds were brewing in the
United States. America was heavily committed to the French war effort which
was, at that time, viewed as the battle front in the struggle to contain
Communism. The US Defense Support Program had been established in 1952 to
provide direct economic and logistic assistance to the French Expeditionary
4
Fall and Raskin, The Vietnam Reader
,
p. 82.
Navarre L'Agonie de l'Indochine
,
pp. 152-226.
Even at the height of the battle for Diem Bien Phu the French had only
about 210 strike aircraft available for combat operations in all of Indochina.
B. B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Harrisburg, Pa. : Stackpole, 1967) p. 258.

Force. The initial allocation was 30.5 million dollars. By 1954 the US
was furnishing hundreds of millions of dollars in aid including scores of
Q
B-26 and F-8-F "Bearcat" aircraft. US aircrews were flying transport and
9
resupply planes on combat missions.
The rapidly deteriorating military situation in Indochina was viewed
with increasing alarm by the US. Influential elements within the Admini-
stration were advocating, in March 1953, direct American military inter-
vention to prevent a Vietminh victory. On 25 March Admiral Radford, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with French General Paul Ely. Ely
was in the United States to elicit increased American aid to stabilize the
military situation permitting France to exit gracefully and honorably,
while making it clear that France was unwilling to continue the war in an
attempt to defeat the Vietminh. Radford, apparently somewhat exceeding his
authority, proposed a massive, one shot, Guernecia-type US air attack,
launched from carriers and US bases in the Phillippines , against the
11
Vietminh besieging Diem Bien Phu.
D. D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday,
1963) p. 167.
o
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (London: Pall Mai
Press, 1967) p. 1070.
As noted both in Buttinger's Dragon Embattled and Victor Bator's,
Vietnam : A Diplomatic Tragedy
,
(Dobbs Ferry, N.J.: Oceana Publishers,
1963) pages 1070 and 206 respectively, this was a far cry from the pre-1950
period when the United States viewed the struggle as a colonial repression
of native nationalism. The Administration went to extraordinary, indeed
almost absurd, lengths to maintain American neutrality. In that context the
U.S. went so far as to insist upon the removal of propellers manufactured in
the United States from aircraft supplied by Great Britain to France for use
in Indochina.





Secretary of State Dulles overruled the Radford plan and replaced it
with a more ambitious "united action" plan. In a speech to the Overseas
Press Club on 29 March 1954 the Secretary said:
The imposition of Southeast Asia of the political
system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist
ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to
the whole Free World community and should not be ._
passively accepted but should be met by united action. .
.
Dulles explained to Henri Bonnet, French ambassador to America, on 5 April
1954 that the US, UK and France must form a democratic, anti-colonial
coalition. That coalition would then take united action to persuade the
13
Vietminh that they did not have the slightest chance of achieving victory.
Growing US concern was evident at Dulles' 5 April press conference when he
refused to rule out unilateral US intervention if the situation continued
14
to deteriorate. The full significance of Dulles' phrase "by whatever means"
became clear when, on the following day, Dulles informed the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs that the threat of Communist victory in any part of South-
east Asia, regardless of means, might result in US intervention.
While the Radford offer for unilateral air intervention had been with-
drawn and tied instead to "united action," the United States seemed in-
creasingly willing to commit American combat elements to the Indochina War.
Apparently stiffened by this new American attitude, France—even as the
12
Department of State Bulletin XXX
,
(Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1954) pp. 539-543.
13Jean Lacoutre and Philippe Deviller, La Fin D'une Guerre (Paris:
L'Editions du Seuil, 1960) p. 79.
1
New York Times , 6 April 1954, p. 4.




the Geneva Conference was opening—was moving rapidly to improve its
military position in Indochina. In a rather pointed maneuver in late April
and early May two French metropolitan divisions, including for the first
time draftees, were innoculated for tropical duty and notified to be pre-
pared for immediate deployment to Indochina. Simultaneously, France was
sending powerful reinforcements to Tonkin in a US supplied and operated air
14** 17lift.
Yet in spite of the French reinforcements and the new US willingness
to intervene as a member of a collective action front, the negotiating
position of the Western Democracies was relatively weak in relation to that
of the Communist nations in general and the DRV in particular. In contrast
to the solid negotiating front maintained by the DRV, USSR and CPR the
Democracies had no front at all. Publically the United States was willing
to intervene only as a member of an anti-colonial, democratic coalition
which France was unwilling to join, fearing such a move would cause the
Conference to fail. Britain was less than enthused over Dulles' united
action proposal and made agreement to such action dependent on French
18
acceptance and a collapse of the Conference.
Of course, overshadowing all other considerations was the battle raging
at Diem Bien Phu with the hopeless plight and ultimate fate of the French
garrison obvious to all. Finally the garrison's agony ended when the fort
All French Union Forces in Indochina were composed entirely of
regulars with no reservists or draftees. W. R. Fishel, Vietnam : Anatomy of
a Conflict (Itasca, 111.: Peacock Publishers, 1968) p. 51.
New York Times
,
22 April 1954, p. 1.
18
Buttinger, Vietnam : A Dragon Embattled
, pp. 821-22 and Bator,
Vietnam : A Diplomatic Tragedy , chapter 3, develops this thesis.

fell with 15,000 French Union POW's on 8 May 1954, just eleven days after
the Geneva Conference opened. The defeat at Diem Bien Phu, more than a
19
simple military disaster, was a crushing political blow to the French
national will to continue.
As the Conference began on 27 April 1954 with the US, UK, USSR, CPR,
DRV, France, Laos, Cambodia and the newly created State of Vietnam in
attendance, the Vietminh were in a commanding position. Diem Bien Phu was
being captured, the Western camp was in disarray and the Vietminh was in
the process of launching a powerful offensive against the French strong-
20
hold in the Tonkin Basin. In fact, French estimates of Vietminh strength
were so depressing that Generals Ely and Salan advocated— in a top secret
report of their official investigation of the Indochina situation—abandon-
ing all of Vietnam north of the 16th parallel to the Vietminh and concen-
21
trating the remaining elements of the Expeditionary Force in South Vietnam.
In this atmosphere the Vietminh leadership had every reason to believe any
settlement would be overwhelmingly in their favor. In this respect they
were to be bitterly disappointed.
Instead of providing the staunch support which might have been expected,
for the DRV's political objectives, Molotov and Chou En-lai took the lead at
Geneva, within the Communist camp, of finding a compromise solution. (See
Appendix I) The major concessions were agreed to first by either Molotov or
Chou En-lai in conference with Western leaders. They then worked agreement
within the Communist group.
19
As high as they were, the casualties suffered by the French Union
Forces at Diem Bien Phu represented less than five percent of the French
forces in Indochina.
20





In this manner Chou abandoned a central DRV contention that the
Cambodian Khmers and Laotian Pathet Lao movements were indigenous, anti-
colonial insurgencies and as such were entitled to local autonomy. On
16 June 1954 Chou called for removal of all foreign troops from Laos and
22Cambodia and a separate settlement of the Cambodian and Laotian questions.
Without directly saying so, Chou made it clear that the Khmers and Pathet
23
Lao were not native insurgents, as claimed by the DRV. This made settle-
ment of the Cambodian and Laotian questions relatively simple and separate
from the infinitely more complex question of Vietnam. Heretofore the DRV
had consistently avoided concessions on this point and had tied a Vietnam
settlement to one in Laos and Cambodia.
Similarly, Molotov agreed, during a series of July meetings with British
Foreign Minister Eden and French Premier Mendes-Frances , to the essential
24
elements of the US-UK seven point memorandum.
22
New York Times , 17 June 1954, p. 1.
23Lacoutre and Deviller, La Fin D'une Guerre
, p. 217.
24
Bator, Vietnam: A Diplomatic Tragedy
,
p. 122. The joint US-UK memo-
randum was an outline of US and UK objectives in Indochina. The stated
objectives were: (1) Independence of Laos and Cambodia to be accomplished by
withdrawal of all Vietminh forces within those countries. (2) Preserve the
Southern half of Vietnam with demarcation not to be south of Dong Hoi
—
just
north of the 17th parallel— and, if possible, an enclave in the Tonkin Delta.
(3) No imposed restrictions on ability of Cambodia, Laos and the free portion
of Vietnam to maintain stable, non-Communist governments—specifically, right
to maintain adequate armed force, import arms and advisors. (4) No political
clause that might lead to the loss of the free zones to the Communists. (5)
Not to rule out possible, future, peaceful reunification of Vietnam. (6) To
permit free transfer of civilians who wish to do so from one zone to the
other. (7) Establish an effective international control system. Lacoutre




8Finally, on July 20, Mendes-France received from Molotov two critical
concessions: provisional partition of Vietnam along the 17th parallel and
elections within two years to determine political reunification of the two
zones instead of demarcation along the 13th parallel and elections within
25
weeks after the armistice as demanded by the DRV. From the Western view
point these two concessions made a settlement possible by providing France
with a package she could accept and justify to her American and British
allies.
The DRV had no real choice but to accept the Sino-Soviet proposed
solution. As strong as the DRV's military position might have been, the
Vietminh would have been hard pressed to maintain their recent gains, much
less continue the offensive without the very significant logistic support
already in progress from China. Thus, even though Molotov' s agreement to
the division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel and Chou En-Lai's declara-
tion on the removal of "foreign" troops from Laos and Cambodia meant with-
drawal from vast tracts of Vietminh controlled territory, the only
alternative to the Chou-Molotov solution bought with concessions of DRV gains
was for the DRV to continue the fight alone. To continue alone would have
been a most difficult, although perhaps possible, task.
A principal DRV objective was, then as it remains today, a unified
Vietnam. The realities of the Vietminh's political and military advantages
notwithstanding the DRV had received little or no support from its nominal
allies, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In the face of
the rapidly hardening Western attitude, under considerable Soviet and
Chinese pressure to reach a compromise solution, the DRV apparently decided
25




that possible political concessions, including a unified Vietnam, which
might—but not necessarily—be forced through continued fighting, were out-
weighed by the possibility of direct American and/or a greatly expanded
French effort.
On 21 July 1954 the Conference reached "agreement" on the settlement
of the Indochina War. The Generva Agreements relating to Vietnam are com-
posed of two principal documents: Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
in Vietnam and the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. The Agree-
ment on the Cessation of Hostilities was a military cease fire agreement
which was signed and executed by the French Union and Vietminh military
authorities. Basically this document provided for:
1. The regrouping of Vietminh forces in North Vietnam and French
Union Forces in South Vietnam within three hundred days of
the signing of the document.
2. The free movement of Vietnamese civilians between the two
zones during those same three hundred days.
3 # A demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam.
4. Prohibition of the establishment of new bases, bases under
the control of a foreign power, introduction of new
weapons or reinforcements or participation of either North
or South Vietnam in any alliance system.
5. Establishment of the International Supervisory and Control
Commission to oversee the armistice.
Significantly, this document is only a military armistice signed by the
respective military commands. All political considerations were left
unresolved.
The political matters were purportedly resolved by the Final Declaration,
The Declaration took note of the agreement to end hostilities in Vietnam
then moved to define a political settlement:
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6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the agree-
ment relating to Vietnam is to settle military questions with a
view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation
line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted
as constituting a political or territorial boundary.
7. The conference declares that... the settlement of political pro-
blems, affected on the basis of respect for the principles of
independence, unity, and territorial integrity shall permit
the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms,
guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result
of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to
ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has
been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free
expression of the national will, general elections shall be held
in July, 1956, under the supervision of an International Super-
visory Commission...
8. The competent representative authorities of the North and South
zones of Vietnam. . .must not permit any individual or collective
reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with
one of the parties during the war... 26
The Declaration clearly states that the demarcation line is not to be con-
strued as a political boundary and commands that national elections to
determine unification, "shall be held in July, 1956," under suitable inter-
national superivision. Yet the Declaration is an unsigned document of
suspect validity without any provision made for enforcement. The Conference
participants, with the notable exceptions of the United States and the State
of Vietnam, merely took note of the Final Declaration and then verbally
assented to its contents.
Both the United States and the State of Vietnam refused even to agree
to the Declaration, implying that the interests of the non-Communist elements
in Vietnam were not being safeguarded. The American representative, Under
Secretary of State W. B. Smith, stated the US position as:
. .
.
(i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of
force to disturb them,...(ii) it would view any re-
newal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid
agreements with grave concern and as seriously
c
Fishel, Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict, pp. 61-67.
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threatening international peace and security...
With respect to the statement made by the
representative of the State of Vietnam, the
United States reiterates its traditional posi-
tion that peoples are entitled to determine
their own future and that it will not join any
arrangement to hinder this... 27
Since the settlement had not worked out in a manner acceptable to the US,
America would not consider itself bound by the Agreements and specifically
that portion relating to the principal of self-determination of the people
2 Q
of South Vietnam. Since the population of the Northern Zone was greater
than that of the south it was conceivable indeed probable, that all of
Vietnam would be united under DRV control if the South did not have a veto
power on this matter.
The conclusion of so vast a war through the instrument of an unsigned
treaty of dubious legitimacy and which two parties central to the war
refused to recognize as binding was a unique development in international
conflict resolution. Not binding any of the parties and the failures of the
United States and the State of Vietnam to even assent to the Declaration
were open invitations to resume hostilities or, for any party, to disregard
any provision of the Declaration not suiting that party's purposes. In view
of the traditional Communist care in regard to the legal niceties of politi-
cal arrangements, the decision to accept a document of suspect legality is
more than somewhat confusing. Not only had the DRV's political objective of
a unified Vietnam been frustrated at Geneva, but the document providing for
27
Department of State Bulletin Volume XXXI #788 (Washington, D.C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1954) pp. 162-163.
28
The Declaration's call for elections on unification made no provisions
for the eventuality that a majority of South Vietnamese voted for independence
but the total pan-Vietnamese vote was for unification.

12
the eventual unification was an unsigned statement not even assented to by
the rival State of Vietnam.
To argue that the DRV accepted these marginally satisfactory arrange-
ments because they expected South Vietnam to be assimilated into the DRV as
a result of the proposed unification elections is to disregard the facts.
The election to unify Vietnam would require agreement of State of Vietnam
which had refused to even agree to the general terms of the Geneva Settle-
ment. Rather, the quiet acquiescence seems to indicate that the DRV and
especially her Communist confederates, the Soviet Union and the CPR,
realized to press for a clear cut military victory was a course fraught with
the unacceptable danger of provoking United States intervention. This
realization prompted settlement for lesser goals. The experiences of Korea
and Germany illustrated the futility of unification of different Sovereign
Zones through peaceful means. Since these methods would hardly be likely to
be more successful in Vietnam, the lack of a signed document relating to
political settlement would preserve DRV freedom of political action to achieve
their primary foreign policy objective: the unification of Vietnam.
If in the First Indochina War the Vietminh had defeated one enemy, they
had acquired another which was determined to prevent DRV expansion and
specifically control of South Vietnam; the United. States. Two days after
the Geneva Conference Secretary of State Dulles outlined the US objectives
in Southeast Asia:
The important thing from now on is not to mourn the
past but to seize the future opportunity to prevent the
loss of Northern Vietnam from leading to the extension
of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. . .We must bear
in mind that the problem is not merely one of deterring
open aggression but preventing Communist subversion which,
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taking advantage of economic dislocation and social
injustice, might weaken and finally overthrow the
non-Communist governments. "
President Eisenhower, fearing these conditions might exist in South Vietnam,
sent his now famous letter to the South Vietnamese Head of State, Prime
Minister Diem, just three months after the Geneva Conference. In that
letter, dated 23 October 1954, the President assured Diem of US military
and economic assistance to thwart any Communist attempt to overthrow his
government:
The implications of the agreements concerning Vietnam
have caused grave concern regarding the future of a
country temporarily divided.
.
.weakened by a long and
exhausting war and faced with enemies without, and
their subversive collaborators within... The purpose of
this offer (military and economic assistance) is to
assist the government of Vietnam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state capable of resist-
ing attempted subversion or aggression through military
means . ^°
To contain what the Eisenhower administration considered aggressive and
expansionistic Chinese Communism and what was then assumed to be their wards,
the DRV, the United States was most active in organizing, almost before the
ink was dry on the Geneva Agreements, the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty.
The Treaty, signed by the US, France, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand,
Pakistan and the Philippines, was designed to defeat both overt, conventional
aggression and covert aggression through subversive activity, became effective
29
Department of State Bulletin Volume XXXI (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1954) p. 163.
30
Council on Foreign Relations , Documents of American Foreign Relations




on 19 February 1955. The 1954 Geneva Agreement prevented Laos, Cambodia
or the regrouping zones of Vietnam from becoming members of a military
alliance system. A protocol to the Treaty extended treaty protection to
those countries:
Realizing the importance to the security of Southeast Asia
and the Southwest Pacific the States of Cambodia, Laos
and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State
of Vietnam, the Council reaffirmed the determination of
the member governments to support these three states in
maintaining their freedom and independence. 32
The extention of anti- communist treaty protection to Laos, Cambodia,
and South Vietnam with the rather pointed protocol reference to the "free
territory" in South Vietnam was understandably viewed in Hanoi, Peking and
Moscow as an action aimed at the DRV: 33
In the Orient, the American imperialists. .. organize the
Southeast Treaty Organization aiming at sabotaging the
Geneva Agreements and the peace in Southeast Asia.->4
The United States and the DRV were even at this early date on a collision
course. The DRV was determined to lead a unified Vietnam while the United
States was equally determined to prevent the spread of Communism in Asia by
supporting independent, non-Communist governments and in particular the
31
Communique of the Southeast Asia Treaty Council on 25 February 1955
in Department of State Bulletin XXXII (Washington, D.C. : Government Print-





"Joint Communique of the Soviet Government and the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam," A. B. Cole, Conflict in Indochina and
International Repercussions 1946-1955 (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University






the State of Vietnam.
In South Vietnam Premier Diem was working a minor miracle rendering a
semblance of order out of chaos. Through skillful political maneuvering
Diem had overcome very significant factional differences and obtained, by
mid-1955, the allegiance of the powerful Hoa Hoa, Cao Dai, and Buddhist
sects and the Army. Arrangements were made for the resettlement of
800,000 refugees from the North, a modest land reform program was insti-
tuted and a measure of political stability was achieved. The emergence in
South Vietnam of a national government which was rapidly consolidating its
power must have been viewed with considerable alarm by the DRV proper and
Southern Vietminh as a rival center of power.
Diem, however, did not feel sufficiently strong to challenge the DRV
at the ballot box. The Geneva Final Declaration simply called for national
elections to determine unification. There was no provision made to cover
the possibility of a majority in South Vietnam opposing unification while a
total Vietnamese vote might have favored unification. Under those circum-
stances South Vietnam would have been united with the North against the will
of the South Vietnamese. North Vietnam with a larger population and an
assured vote of 99.6% (which presumably would be delivered) favoring unifica-
tion would cause South Vietnam to be absorbed by the DRV even if the equally
deliverable southern vote was not in favor of unification.
35
On 27 June 1950 Predient Truman established the support of non-
communist, independent governments in Asia as an American objective follow-
ing the outbreak of the Korean War. Department of State Bulletin XXIII
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952) p. 5.
Fall and Raskin, The Vietnam Reader, pp. 75-78.
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With at least tacit US approval, Diem refused to participate in the
called for unification elections. Conveniently recalling that the State
of Vietnam had not become party to the Final Declaration, Diem declined
DRV attempts to schedule the elections:
We did not sign the Geneva Agreements .. .but it is out
of the question to consider any proposal from the
Vietminh if proof is not given that they put the
superior interests of the National Community above
those of Communism. .
.
This refusal was met with relatively mild protest from the DRV. However,
in South Vietnam, as the 20 July deadline approached without any prospects
for elections the former Vietminh, now to be called Viet Cong, initiated an
37
assassination campaign against local level government officials. At
first the insurgency was extremely small, with limited capabilities and
OQ
virtually no outside or foreign assistance. Had Diem responded to this
threat with the attitude that when 'freedom is threatened the best defense
is more freedom' it might have been contained. Instead Diem himself set
the stage and played the tune which led to widespread insurgency.
At the conclusion of the First Indochina War many former guerilla
fighters refused movement to the North and returned to civilian occupations.
Hidden among these legitimate civilians were about 5000 hardcore, elite
Vietminh "stay-behinds"; that is, guerrillas who pretended to resume civilian
chores but in actuality remained guerrillas who had simply hidden their
39









recognized the threat these hardcore stay-behinds posed. The Diem govern-
ment initiated a program to locate and identify former Vietminh. Many so
identified were no longer affiliated with the resistance movement yet they
were subjected to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and/or bureaucratic
harrassment.
To combat the rising incidence of terror, Diem issued, in January 1956,
the infamous Presidential Ordinance Number Six, which provided for the in-
definite detention of persons determined by military tribunal to be
"dangerous for national defense and public security." This ordinance
was followed by more repressive measures. Their impact was significantly
greater on the non-Communist nationalist elements, which in a normal society
might have been categorized as the oposition, than on the Communist-led sub-
versives who were geared for clandestine operations. These harsh, repres-
sive actions drove many non-Communist, liberal and moderate South Vietnamese
into the insurgents' open arms if for no ouher reason than to escape, life
41
and limb intact, from Diem.
The insurgent's stepped up program of rural political indoctrination
was punctuated by assassination. The Viet Cong preferred to label them
42
"executions" by People's Courts for crimes against the people. The assas-
sinations were generally highly selective with the objective of destroying
Government of Vietnam control in a specific area through the elimination of
Republic of Vietnam local officials: province, district and hamlet chiefs,













"lessons" to the population and demonstrations of the government's in-
ability to govern in peace with safety. The insurgent's shadow government
would then administer the area.
To maintain national control of the rural population in the face of the
rapidly rising incidence of terrorist activity in June 1965 Diem, by Execu-
tive Decree, abolished all elected village councils and mayors and filled
43
vacancies by appointment, usually from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
Thus Diem, by July 1965, wielded the same dictatorial powers in the country-
side as he had for some time held in Saigon: the dictatorship of Diem was
complete. In the short space of two years Ngo Dinh Diem had been transformed
from savior to despot, alienating almost every sector of South Vietnamese
society: dissent was rewarded with detention in prison, army commanders
were appointed on the basis of personal loyalty to Diem instead of command
ability, the regime was run by the Diem Family clique isolated from the
governed, the land reform program was not effectively administered, wide-
spread corruption permeated most levels of government and what limited means
the public had of influencing their daily lives through their village council
was denied. Diem, instead of broadening hi s political base, had significantly
narrowed it through his unenlightened policies and in so doing had provided
the sparks to light the conflagration of revolution.
As might have been expected, the infant Viet Cong insurgency flourished
44
under this inept approach. In the Summer or early Fall of 1959 the DRV
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decided to enter the Southern struggle and guide the revolution to a suc-
cessful conclusion. In reference to the war Ho Chi Minh was quoted in a
1960 article appearing in the Belgium periodical Red Flag:
We have to direct and bring to a close the middle-
class, democratic and anti-imperialistic revolution.
^
The very rapidly deteriorating political situation in South Vietnam
seemed to favor clandistine intervention to quickly affect a satisfactory
resolution to the problem before increased American assistance could affect
the outcome. While Ho Chi Minh was announcing in effect that the DRV would
support and direct the southern revolutionary struggle, it is important to
note: first, that the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
46had not yet been formed, and second, since the Front did not officially
exist there must have already existed in South Vietnam some administrative
apparatus to funnel this DRV assistance to the insurgents.
The increased guerrilla activity of late 1959 and 1960 produced reac-
tions by the Diem regime which led to counter and counter-counter actions
rapidly blowing a low level insurgency into a major conflict. Through a
series of executive decrees Diem further strengthened his dictatorial
strangle hold on those portions of Vietnam still under government control
during this period. The most famous of these decrees was the Executive
Order of February, 1959 which set a penalty of death for "accomplices of
Communism." These sentences were to be administered by the Provincial
45
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military tribunals and their sentences were without appelate rights.
The increasingly arbitarary nature of the Saigon regime led to further
civilian alienation which in turn resulted in greater guerrilla recruiting
and political success. Since the population was less sympathetic to the
Government of Vietnam it becamse more difficult to obtain accurate intel-
ligence on the guerrilla's whereabouts and intentions. The poor intelligence
helped to prevent the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) from register-
ing significant military success. Counter-guerrilla operations became more
and more scarce. The enemy had better intelligence and fought only when
they considered it advantageous to do so.
The situation had, by mid-1960, become so acute that several of Diem's
non-Communist critics, among them some of South Vietnam's leading personages,
literally took their lives in their hands and presented the regime a list of
grievances concerning Diem's Administration. This list of grievances was
called the Manifesto of the Eighteen. Their comments on Policy, Administration.
the Army and Social-Economic affairs are an instructive insight into some of
the major problems confronting the South Vietnamese:
Let us try to draw an objective balance of the situation,
without flattery or false accusations, strictly follow-
ing a constructive line which you yourself have so often
indicated, in the hope that the government shall modify
its policies so as to extricate itself from a situation
that is extremely dangerous to the very existence of the
nation.
Policies
Continuous arrests fill the jails and prisons to the
rafters .. .public opinion and the press are reduced to
silence. The same applies to the popular will as trans-
lated in certain open elections, in which it is insulted
and trampled...
Today the people want freedom. You should, Mr. Presi-
dent, liberalize the regime, promote democracy, guarantee
minimum civil rights, recognize the opposition so as to
permit the citizens to express themselves without fear...
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When this occurs, the people of South Vietnam, in
comparing their positions with that of the North,
will appreciate the value of true liberty and
authentic democracy.
Adminis tration
...Competent people should be put back in the proper
jobs. . .Favoritism based on family or party connections
should be banished; the selling of influence, corruption
and abuse of power must be punished.
Army
The purpose of the army, pillar of the defense of the
country, is to stop foreign invasions and to eliminate
rebel movements. It is at the service of the country
and should not lend itself to the exploitations of any
faction or party... The troops should be encouraged to
respect their officers and the officers should be
encouraged to love their men...
Economic and Social Affairs
The government must destroy all the obstacles
standing in the way of economic development; must abolish
all forms of monopoly and speculation; must create a
favorable environment for investments coming from foreign
friends as well as from our own citizens; must encourage




The Eighteen had fingered almost every issue which was contributing to the
disruption of life in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, their advice went un-
heeded and in November of 1960 the first of several coups was attempted
against Diem when ARVN paratroopers seized Saigon. Although the coup was
unsuccessful it had far reaching effects, principally, it forced Diem to be
even more selective in the appointment of military commanders and to retain
in Saigon sufficient troops to protect himself in case of a repeat attempt.
What remained of personal liberty vanished and Diem became even more
isolated from the nation which he was "leading."
The United States remained committed to Diem or at least was unable
to induce him to liberalize his regime and to make it more responsive to
47





the needs of its citizens. In spite of the obvious deficiencies of Diem's
leadership, the US apparently felt he was at least non-Communist. In any
event, the RVN was the recipient of increasing American technical, logistic
and military—in the form of advisors—assistance. In the deepening Vietnam
crisis of the early 1960's, President J. F. Kennedy reaffirmed American sup-
port for the RVN's struggle against subversion:
The United States for more than a decade has been
assisting the Government and people of Vietnam to
maintain their independence. . .Article IV (SEATO)
stated that the United States recognized that
aggression by means of armed attack against Vietnam
would threaten our own security .. .We are attempting
to prevent a Communist take-over in Vietnam. ..48
North Vietnamese assistance to the NLF had become so open that in June,
1962 the International Supervisory and Control Commission confirmed what had
been known for some time when it found North Vietnam guilty of aiding and
abetting that subversion in South Vietnam. The Commission cited North
Vietnam for sending arms, munitions and men to fight for the overthrow of
the RVN and the People's Army of Vietnam for permitting North Vietnam to be
49
used as a base for aggression in the South.
The deteriorating military and political situation in Vietnam had, by
mid-1963, assumed catastrophic proportions. A US Operation Mission survey
dated 14 June 1963 indicated that the Viet Cong taxed almost the entire
population of South Vietnam including Saigonese. The survey rated Government
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six of South Vietnam's provinces. Earlier, in January 1963, elements of
the Viet Cong 514th Main Force Battalion had staged the guerrilla's first
51
stand-and-fight battle of the war, inflicting heavy casualties on the ARVN.
During the course of the battle, the Viet Cong downed five helicopters and
fought two thousand ARVN troops to a stand still near the Mekong Delta
village of Ap Bac, clearly demonstrating Viet Cong ability to deal with ARVN
elements in set battles. Village chiefs were being assassinated at a rate
52
of over one thousand per year. In 1962 the Viet Cong captured only four
hundred more individual weapons than they lost while in 1963 that figure
53increased to thirty-one hundred. The ARVN desertion rate was skyrocketing
54
and by mid-1963 almost thirty percent of all replacements deserted. In
orther words, by virtually every military yardstick the war was being lost
at an accelerating pace. The Viet Cong were obviously getting ready to
shift from Phase II to Phase III of guerrilla warfare.
U.S. Operations Mission, Saigon, Resources Control Survey (Saigon:
14 June 1963, declassified 1 January 1964)
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General Vo Nguyen Giap, in his book People's War : People's Army
(New York, N.Y. : Praeger 1962), outlined the maxims of guerrilla warfare
and divided the wars into three phases:
I. Organizational. Little or no fighting with the insurgents
building a political base on which to operate. Limited
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If the military situation was desperate, the political scene was
equally alarming. Buddhist religious opposition to the Catholic Diem
regime was daily gaining momentum. On 8 May 1963 twelve persons were
killed in a Buddhist anti-government riot in Hue. Following those demon-
57
strations in Hue, martial law was proclaimed on 3 June. The political
crisis was heightened on 11 June when, in the first of several such acts,
a Buddhist priest died as a result of self-immolation in protest of the
CO
Diem regime. In response to the massive religious strife sweeping Vietnam,
59
Diem proclaimed martial law throughout Vietnam.
Massive US military, technical and economic assistance notwithstanding,
Diem had succeeded in alienating almost every segment of South Vietnamese
society, providing the insurgents with ample political ammunition to under-
mine Government of Vietnam (GVN) control throughout South Vietnam. A some-
times overlooked fact of paramount importance was Diem's conversion of the
ARVN from a proud, reasonably efficient and organized army into a
assassinations designed as "lessons" to "educate" the
population.
II. Strategic Defense. Small unit ambushes against exposed enemy
positions. Marked by careful planning and avoidance of con-
tact with superior enemy formations.
III. Strategic Counter Offensive. As a result of many probing
attacks on periphery, enemy has become dispersed and weakened.
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faction-ridden, inefficient organization, where officer promotion was based
on political favor instead of ability.
In a move born of desperation the United States apparently signaled
ARVN military dissidents in the Fall of 1963 that the American 'sink or swim
with Diem' policy was over and consequently the US would not be displeased
over a military coup. Such a coup was carried out on 1 November when Diem
was replaced by a military junta. The most damaging and lasting legacy
left by Diem was the tradition of factionalism and competing interest groups
which Diem had played off against each other.
In addition to a counter-insurgency struggle Diem had fostered consider-
able in-fighting among non-Communist elements, pitting Buddhists against
Catholics, Montagnard against lowlanders, Northern refugees against
indigenous South Vietnamese, the Army against the civilians and peasants
en
against urban dwellers. The prejudices, suspicions and wounds inflicted
during this sometimes vicious and deadly war within a war will be years in
healing. This legacy of bitterness will make the formation of a truly
united front in opposition to the NLFSVN most difficult because of the dis-
trust and hatred between competing groups of non-Communist South Vietnamese.
Neither the government resulting from the 1 November coup, nor any of
those in the bewildering succession that followed during the next eighteen
months, was able to stabilize or reverse the military situation which was
collapsing at an accelerating rate. By January 1965, it was clear that
New York Times
,
March 11, 1963, p. 1. In the process of the coup Diem
was arrested and then assassinated.
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without the immediate introduction of US combat elements and supporting
arms to stiffen the will of the ARVN and check the flood of NVA/Viet Cong
ft 1
successes, the prospects for the RVN's survival were most remote. With
this fact in mind, NLF/DRV actions during the second half of 1964 and early
1965 appear illogical and ill-considered. Especially with respect to the
US their tactics were at cross purposes with their strategic objective, the
overthrow of the Republic of Vietnam and the unification of Vietnam.
As early as January, 1964 the US had sounded warnings on the gravity
of the Vietnam situation and reaffirmed the absolute US opposition to a
Communist victory in South Vietnam, Secretary of Defense McNamara, in a
prepared statement before the House Armed Forces Committee on 27 January
1964 stated:
...The survival of an independent government in South
Vietnam is so important to the security of Southeast
Asia and to the free world I can conceive of no
alternative other than to take all necessary measures ,
,
within our capability to prevent a Communist victory....
An even more direct warning was sounded on 22 May by Secretary Rusk:
...A third choice would be to expand the war. This
can be the result if the Communists persist in their
course of aggression."^
The United States was not going to passively watch the DRV achieve a victory
in Vietnam.
In spite of the unmistakable American warnings, the NLF/DRV embarked
upon a policy which on the surface seemed designed to provoke the United
f> 1
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States. The terrorist attacks aimed specifically at causing US casualties,
such as the Christmas Eve, 1964 bombing of a Saigon restaurant frequented
by American servicemen (two killed in action, fifty- two US wounded in
action) and the 11 February 1965 bombing of the US barracks at Qui Nhan
(nineteen US killed in action, thirteen US wounded in action) as well as the
several DRV PT boat attacks on US Navy destroyers in International Waters,
invited direct US military response. Given the hostile mood of the Johnson
Administration and the traditional American insistence on freedom of the
seas, the PT boat attacks could hardly have failed to provoke the violent
reaction which followed those engagements.
What prompted these NLF/DRV tactics? Why, for instance, did the NLF
and the DRV not concentrate exclusively on the collapsing RVN and purposely
exclude US personnel as specific targets rather than singling out Americans?
It is entirely possible the DRV leadership did not believe the US would
decisively intervene. In 1954 there had been some very bellicose statements
threatening US military action to save a traditional, white, European ally
which had never been translated into action in spite of the humiliation of
an ally surely more significant and valued than Nguyen Cao Ky's South
Vietnam. Since the 1954 settlement the DRV had consistently identified the
US as its principal enemy, claiming the surest way to destroy the US puppet
regime in South Vietnam was to defeat the United States. DRV political
judgment, over a period of years, could conceivably been effected by state-
ments such as:
...our people clearly realize that imperialist gangs
never can bear to negotiate. . .no matter how much they
lose... on the battlefield. Revolutionary people who






During the current phase the immediate real foes
of the people in the South are the American
imperialists.""
Whether victims of their own propaganda or through a lack of under-
standing of the difficulties any U.S. Administration would face in commit-
ting American ground forces to an Asian War without the severest provocation,
the DRV proceeded to supply the provocative action which led to the direct
U.S. involvement. The 2 and 4 August, 1964, PT boat attacks on U.S.
destroyers patrolling the Tonkin Gulf prompted the first direct American
f\ 7
retaliatory military action against the DRV. However, even more important
than the retaliatory air strikes was the joint Resolution of Congress that
these attacks in international waters prompted. With no significant debate
the Congress authorized the President to take virtually any step he alone
considered necessary in a vast and troubled area:
...as the President determines, to take all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to assist
any member or protocol state of the South East Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in
the defense of its freedom. "°
This resolution, which was passed 88-2 in the Senate and 416-0 in the
House, quite suddenly granted prior Congressional approval to any Presi-
dential commitment of U.S. national forces to the Vietnam War. Even with-
out this specific resolution it is entirely probable that U.S. forces would
have been dispatched to Vietnam to prevent a Communist victory. However, the
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attacks on U.S. Navy vessels on the high seas galvanized the U.S. Congress
and foreclosed debate on a resolution which under almost any other circum-
stances would have encountered strong opposition. It almost certainly would
have been ammended to make it less of a pre-given rubber stamp approval of
Congress' right to declare war. As the resolution stands, the President can
take any action, including the use of armed force, which he determines nec-
essary to protect South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Thailand, Great Britain, France, Australia or New Zealand. This resolution
is then, in effect, a global blank check with staggering implications: even
as we debate withdrawal from the quagmire of Vietnam, the President retains
prior Congressional approval to intervene, to combat subversion or defend
against aggression, if invited by the host state, in, for instance, Laos or
even Great Britain to help the British quell "subversion" in Northern
Ireland.
President Johnson chose to interpret the resolution as a mandate for
direct U.S. intervention and on 7 March 1965. The one thing which could pre-
vent DRV/NLF control of South Vietnam began with the commitment of 3,500
69
Marines, the first American ground elements, to the Vietnam War. With
this first step taken the U.S. troop commitment rapidly expanded to eleven
divisions, numerous independent brigades and regiments and supporting arms.'
The nightmare had become reality. The involvement in a major Asian land
war advised against by so many eminent American military officers was a fact.
Almost as soon as the first American troops waded ashore from the U.S.
Seventh Fleet ships the United States began looking for a way out of a war
69
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which had caught the U.S. in the throes of a dilemma so aptly described by
Walter Lippmann as a choice between "an unattainable victory and unaccept-
able defeat." The DRV's decision to commit People's Army of Vietnam
units and lend large scale logistic support to assist in the "liberation"
of South Vietnam was in direct opposition to the American determination to
maintain the independence of the Republic of Vietnam. This basic conflict





There are essentially six principals deciding the fate of South
Vietnam: the four belligerents (the United States, the Republic of Vietnam,
the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam) plus the two main supporters of the DRV: the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China. The resolution of a war through
diplomatic channels under what might be called ordinary circumstances of
belligerency has always been a most difficult task. By definition, war is
the continuation of national foreign policy by armed force after failure to
achieve national objectives by other means. Attempts to solve a conflict
through diplomatic channels is therfore a return to a method which had
previously failed. In Vietnam this inherent difficulty is compounded by
additional contradictions. Neither the RVN/US nor the NLF/DRV has been able
to achieve the convincing military ascendancy necessary to make the other
side view concessions on key issues, which could make a negotiated settle-
ment possible, as preferable to continued fighting which might lead to a
wholly unfavorable resolution on the battlefield.
In addition to belligerency status, the U.S., as the so called Free
World Leader, is in world wide competition with both the Soviet Union and
Communist China for influence in other nations. The U.S. is committed to a
containment policy of these two countries which the U.S. has judged as
aggressive and hostile; whose expansion would jeopardize American National
security. The Soviet Union and CPR are, on the other hand, engaged in the
previously mentioned competition with the U.S. to replace American or Western
influence with Soviet or Chinese influence. Perhaps more significantly the
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Soviet Union and CPR are vying for leadership ascendancy within the Com-
munist World. This struggle has produced vicious political in-fighting,
name calling and recently armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet frontier. In
that battle for influence, Vietnam has become a pawn used by each side in
attempts to justify either the Soviet or Chinese interpretation of the
Marxist doctrine.
The U.S. has assumed a pivotal position in the struggle for influence.
Since the mid-1950's the Soviet Union has been the champion of peaceful
coexistence with direct competition and confrontation with the U.S. limited
to the sphere of economics because thermonuclear war is obviously suicidal
for both the super powers. China, on the other hand, has advocated the
expansion of communism into Western dominated or Third World areas through
people's wars of national liberation. An aggressive, high risk, anti-
American foreign policy has been championed by the CPR as the best way to
overcome U.S. influence. It is important to note that this high risk policy
is to be conducted by the Soviet Union, the Communist super power, and not by
the CPR.
The application of U.S. military power against a bloc country produced
policy modifications by both China and the Soviet Union: the Soviets, be-
cause the U.S. was not peacefully coexisting, and China because the use of
In his celebrated "secret speech" Nikita S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956 in which Khrushchev
not only denounced the crimes committed by the Stalin regime, but also made
some significant changes in Soviet Foreign Policy. First, while affirming
the irreconcilability of communism and capitalism, Khrushchev maintained that
war was no longer inevitable. The change in the balance of world power, he
asserted, made it possible for communism to maintain the world peace while
still thwarting the "schemes of the war-makers." The Foreign Policy of the
Soviet Union
,
edited, with introductions and notes, by Alvin Z. Rubinstein
(New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1966) pp. 282-84.
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U.S. power so close to China could easily spread to China itself if Chinese
support for or association with the DRV/NLF became too direct or open. Thus
both China and the Soviet Union were forced by U.S. intervention to modify
their foreign policy while at the same time struggling for ascendancy within
the Communist Orb and Third World.
The frame work for competition, how best to defeat the U.S., has pro-
duced, with the advent of U.S. intervention, an interesting anomaly which
will be investigated in Chapter III. Specifically the Soviets champion
peaceful coexistance and the settlement of differences by negotiations, yet
in Vietnam, are the prime suppliers of war material to the DRV and call for
a "united front" to defend the DRV. China, on the other hand, in the ideo-
logical struggle, advocates a high risk foreign policy without regard to the
possibility of nuclear warfare, yet in Vietnam has made only limited contri-
butions to the defense of the DRV, has spurned the Soviet call for a
"united front" and has been most cautious in dealing with the United States
in Vietnam.
Before analyzing the prospects for peace in Vietnam, the basic policy
objectives of each of the six principals, as well as what each party con-
siders to be obstacles to peace in Vietnam must be identified. The recent
history of Vietnam will be viewed through different refracting lenses in
Saigon, Washington, Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and the jungle hideout of the
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.
The National Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam
The insurgency in the South following the First Indochina War grew and
received support from two sources. The first source was from the people in
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South Vietnam. In the effort to round up the 5,000 or so active Vietminh
"stay-behinds" the Diem regime had resorted to quasi-legal and arbitrary
proceedings aimed principally at all former Vietminh regardless of affilia-
tion with the "stay-behinds." These practices resulted in a de facto viola-
tion of the 1954 Geneva Agreements' guarantees prohibiting reprisals against
fromer enemies. For self preservation, many former Vietminh went underground
2
again in the South.
The Vietminh effort to organize an insurgency in South Vietnam was given
a powerful boost by the repressive, dictatorial decrees issued by President
3Diem during 1955 and 1956. Almost daily the population became less identi-
fied with the GVN which, instead of appearing as a protector of their best
interests, came to symbolize a corrupt and dictatorial regime. The jails
were overflowing with non-Communist dissenters, whole army corps were
stationed around Saigon not to protect the city from guerrilla attack but
rather to protect Diem from a coup, and the land reform program was not
effectively distributing the land to the peasants. In such an atmosphere,
insurgency was bound to flourish if provided with dynamic leadership. Such
leadership was available in the "stay-behinds" and in former Vietminh
driven by Diem into the insurgent's camp.
Preying on the very real deficiencies of the Diem regime, the Vietminh
was able to significantly increase their numbers from several thousand in
4
1955 to tens of thousands in 1959. The exigencies of combat, the dangers
2
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of daily life and similar ideological goals welded the guerrillas into a
tight-knit group whose bonds have been tempered in the heat of battle. Such
bonds, once formed, are almost unbreakable. The compelling ties are illu-
strated in a diary captured during the First Indochina War from the body of
Nguyen Binh, a popular Vietminh commander in South Vietnam:
I had reached the stage where the only alternatives
were to yield and do what was asked of me, thus
ensuring my own destruction and the victory of the
Party, or else to resist, going over to Bao Dai. But
if I had changed sides I could never have persuaded
myself that I had not been a traitor. It would have
been treachery towards my comrades in the Resistance,
the living and the dead... I belong on their side, and
on their side I stay; for a battle fought together for
years supplies the place of conviction. ->
When writing this, Binh seems to have been aware that Le Duan—now First
Secretary of the Lao Dong, Communist Party of Vietnam, but in the early 1950's
responsible for the purges of Southern Party members—had been sent from
North Vietnam to liquidate Binh and remove a possible rival to the DRV develop-
er
ing in North Vietnam. Yet the comradship between Binh and his men was so
strong that he could not defect. Shortly after this diary entry Binh was
betrayed by Le Duan to a French commanded Cambodian light infantry patrol and
was shot to death.
The second source of support was from the DRV which has provided arms,
Q
munitions, manpower and leadership. In December of 1960 the National Front
Richard Critchfield, The Long Charade: Political Subversion in Vietnam






The International Supervision and Control Commission finding of 2 June
1962 with Canada and India voting for and Poland against that there was
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for the Liberation of South Vietnam was formed. Following its formation the
NLF published their Program on 20 December 1960. The essential features of
that program are:
... Overthrow the camouflaged colonial regime of the
American imperialists. . .institute a government of
national democratic union. . .Institute a largely
liberal and democratic regime based on universal
sufferage.
...Establish an independent and sovereign economy,
and improve the living conditions of the people...
implement agrarian reform with the aim of providing
land for the tillers...
. . . Reestablish normal relations between the two
zones and prepare for peaceful reunification of the
country .. .Struggle against all aggressive war and
defend universal peace...
9
The NLF is formed around the People's Revolutionary Party which is in
fact the Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party (the Communist Party of North
Vietnam.) A secret Lao Dong circular dated 7 December 1961 informed party
members that the People's Revolutionary Party was independent in name only
and was actually the Southern branch of the Lao Dong Party which was unified
from North to South.
Under Le Duan's careful tutelage the NLF built the base for protracted
struggle in the South. The Communist infrastructure was established village
by village. The guerrillas closely identified themselves with the peasants
"sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt" that the People's
Army of Vietnam was permitting North Vietnam to be used as a base for of-
fensive operations designed to overthrow the government of South Vietnam
cited in Department of State, Aggression from the North
, p. 2.
9
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The prepared statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 1966 cited in
The Vietnam Hearings
,
edited with introductory notes by Senator J. W.
Fulbright (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1967) p.
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who in turn supplied the guerrillas with food and more important, intel-
ligence. By the early 1960's the struggle in South Vietnam was in the
second phase of Giap's outline for guerrilla warfare. Le Duan's future is
intricately tied to the fortunes of the Southern insurgency. He has taken
credit for the NLF successes. Likewise he must shoulder the responsibility
if his project should fail.
Events following the assassination of Diem prompted a major shift in
the tactics of the revolution. The confusion and political in-fighting in
South Vietnam appeared to offer the opportunity of a rapid solution to the
war. In contravention to Giap's and Mao's theories of guerrilla warfare,
the struggle in South Vietnam was upgrade to Phase III, or a
General Giap's theoretical treatment of people's wars is in agreement
with Mao's view that the guerrilla resorts to "conventional war of maneuver"
to annihilate the enemy only after the balance of power has shifted in favor
of the guerrillas. When that condition has been met the guerrilla units are
formed into conventional military formations and the enemy is engaged in
conventional set-piece battles and annihilated by superior guerrilla fire-
power. Prior to the shift in the balance of power the guerrillas, in Phase
II, engage the enemy only in carefully planned attacks where, through con-
centration of forces the guerrilla unit achieves local fire superiority.
The enemy unit is rapidly destroyed and the guerrilla units withdraw and
disperse immediately to prevent their own annihilation when superior enemy
reinforcements arrive.
With the introduction of U.S. elements in 1965 the balance of power
shifted away from the NLF. The key issue in Hanoi and South Vietnam was
whether to return to Phase II or continue in Phase III in spite of the U.S.
manpower and firepower superiority. Le Duan was the leading spokesman in
Hanoi for the strategy of continuation of the war of maneuver and offensive
tactics. Answering Lin Piao's call for a strategic retreat in the face of
the superior American strength Le Duan said on 26 July 1966, "We cannot auto-
matically apply the evolutionary experiences of other countries in our own
country.... It is not fortuitous that in the history of our country, each
time we rose up to oppose foreign aggression, we took the offensive and not
the defensive. .. .Taking the offensive is a strategy while talcing the defensive
is only a stratagem. Since the day the South Vietnamese people rose up. they
have continually taken the offensive." Cited in D. S. Zagoria, The Vietnam
Triangle; Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York, N.Y.: Pegasus, 1967) p. 84. In
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conventional war of maneuver, to annihilate the GVN. The careful guerrilla
ground work was pushed into the background as NVA and NLF elements shifted
12
to large scale military operations. In this shift of tactics, Le Duan
took a great risk since to support the expanded effort, guerrillas would be
forced to increase taxes and conscript, for the first time, guerrilla fighters
in large numbers. These measures were bound to alienate the population they
had won over. Therefore, if the guerrillas were not quickly successful, the
shift to Phase III could prove disastrous to their carefully developed infra-
structure. As we have already seen, this move, although initially successful,
led to the massive United States intervention in the Spring of 1965.
As long as American troops remain in Vietnam it is probably not possible
for the NLF to achieve their objective of overthrowing the Government of
South Vietnam. Out of necessity the initial objective of the NLF changed in
1965 from the overthrow of the GVN to. the withdrawal of American units which
would facilitate achievement of the primary goal of overthrow of the GVN.
The new NLF position was outlined to an American professor, R. S. Browne, and
a French journalist, Georges Chaffard, who visited NLF leaders shortly after
the American intervention. Browne reported the NLF goals as:
1. An immediate cease fire, with a freezing of the current military
situation.
2. Adjudication by an international body in districts where control is
in dispute.
3. U.S. preparation and execution of a withdrawal of all American and
puppet (meaning all other non-ARVN units in South Vietnam) troops
over a six month period.
other words counter to the advice from their Chinese allies the DRV intended
to remain on the offensive against the Americans. This strategy called for a
continued offensive, regardless of the superior U.S. firepower, as the
"correct" method for defeating the U e S. and their puppets.
12





4. District by district elections from which a coalition government
could emerge. -*
Chaffard received a lengthy interview with Huyn Than Phat, Vice President of
the NLF, which he reported on in the 25 April 1965 issue of L'Express:
Our first task will be to rebuild the economy of South
Vietnam. For that we will need... foreign economic aid...
To get aid from Western countries we will have to follow
a policy of neutrality. We know the capitalists. They
will want guarantees. We are realists. Even United
States aid will be welcome...
We will not even approach the problem of unification
for a very long time... When the time comes for unification
it will take place on a basis precluding annexation of one
zone by another. 14
There are in these statements two important deviations from previous
NLF stands regarding acceptable solutions to the war in South Vietnam. For
the first time a coalition government is mentioned as a means of settlement.
Although a true coalition government with the Ky leadership of the Republic
of Vietnam would hardly have been acceptable to the NLF, the very idea that
the NLF might be willing to include non-NLF members in a coalition government
was a significant shift in position. The second was Phat's statements con-
cerning eventual unification contained the concept of an independent, at
least for a period of years, South Vietnam which would be a neutral state.
This does not necessarily mean the NLF was, at that time, abandoning the
ultimate objective of eventual unification. Rather, the NLF leadership was
bending to the military realities. As long as the U.S. remained actively
engaged an NLF military victory was and is unlikely. Therefore the surest
way to political victory was through concessions to the U.S. sensibilities.
It was among the first indications that the NLF could show signs of true
13





, 25 April 1965.
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independence from North Vietnam and that the NLF leadership might reserve




The Leadership of the DRV has traditionally regarded Vietnam as a single
country temporarily divided into Northern and Southern zones by external
forces. In March of 1955, following the ratification of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty, Ho Chi Minn objected that the Treaty was aimed
specifically at violating the Geneva Agreements with regard to unification:
In the Orient, the American imperialists.
.
.organize
the Southeast Treaty Organization aiming at sabotag-
ing the Geneva Agreements and the peace in Southeast
Asia. 1^
Three months later on 5 June 1955 Ho Chi Minh reiterated the basic DRV belief
that Vietnam was a single country:
Vietnam is one. The Vietnamese nation is one. No
force can divide them, whoever tries to partition
Vietnam is the enemy of the Vietnamese people and
will surely be defeated. 1°
When Diem refused to permit the unification elections called for in the
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference in 1954 the DRV, at first, con-
fined itself to verbal assaults on the Diem regime. However, as the indigen-
ous southern insurgency gained momentum the DRV sought to assume the mantel
of leadership and support became more open and obvious. General Nguyen Vo
Giap, Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the North Vietnamese armed
forces, explained in 1960 the role that the DRV was playing in the revolution:







The North has become a large rear-echelon of our
army... the North is the revolutionary base for the
entire country. ^'
"Our army" pointedly refers to the southern insurgents and such phraseology
indicates continuing DRV belief in a single, unified Vietnam and the extent
to which the DRV is tied to the war in the South.
Although admitting to supporting the southern insurgency, the DRV has
never acknowledged the presence in South Vietnam of anything other than
"Vietnamese" forces. Since Vietnam is one, there is, in DRV lexicon, no
difference between NLF and NVA elements. The differences exist only between
Vietnamese people and "puppet" troops.
The DRV is committed to the unification of Vietnam under DRV control.
That was the objective in 1954, it was the objective in 1960 and 1965 and it
is still the objective today. In the DRV's so called Four Point Plan for
peace in Vietnam, the subject of unification is mentioned in three of the
four points, which is an indication of the importance attached to that sub-
ject in Hanoi. On 8 April 1965 Premier Phan Van Dong established the North
Vietnamese negotiating position after the introduction of American combat
elements
:
1. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese people
—peace, independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integ-
rity... the United States .. .must withdraw from South Vietnam
all. .. troops , military personnel and weapons of all kinds, dis-
mantle all United States military bases... stop its acts of
war against North Vietnam.
2. Pending the peaceful unification. .. the military provisions of the
1954 Geneva Agreements. . .must be strictly respected...
3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South
Vietnamese people themselves, in accordance with the program of
the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam without
any foreign interference.
Hoc Tap (Hanoi, DRV), January 1960, p. 3.
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4. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam is to be settled by the
Vietnamese people without any foreign interference. 1°
It is important to note that in point three the problems in South
Vietnam must be solved in accordance with the NLF's program, the first point
of which calls for the overthrow of the Government of South Vietnam, while
other elements define unification as inherent in each point. Taken to-
gether with the demand for United States withdrawal as a pre-condition to
peace in South Vietnam the Four Point proposal is an uncompromising stand,
offering little room for fruitful negotiations. Since US troops were intro-
duced to save the Government of Vietnam and their withdrawal in 1965, 1966,
or 1967 would probably have led to a DRV/NLF victory, United States with-
drawal was most unlikely. Such a victory was viewed as totally unsatis-
factory in Washington. There would have to be some fundamental position
changes if the US and DRV were to talk peace.
The Republic of Vietnam
The RVN has, since Geneva 1954, had an almost pathological fear of
being absorbed by the DRV. The RVN refused to become party to the Final
Declaration fearing the grater voter appeal of Ho Chi Minn would result in
DRV control of the South. In response to a call by the DRV for consulta-
tions on the 1956 unfication elections Diem made clear the RVN view of
unification:
We did not sign the Geneva Agreements. . .but it is
out of the question to consider any proposal from
the Vietminh if proof is not given that they put
the superior interests of the National Community
above those of Communism. **
1 8
New York Times, 14 August 1965, p. 3.




In other words, as far as Diem was concerned, there would be no elections
as long as the North was under Communist control.
The first point of the NLF's program and the third point of the DRV's
peace formula calling for the replacement of the GVN are obviously un-
satisfactory to the RVN. The RVN has, until the very recent past, been
totally unwilling to deal with those it considered as aggressing against the
nation state of South Vietnam; the NLF because it was attempting by force of
arms to overthrow the government of South Vietnam and the DRV because they
were aiding, assisting and abetting the NLF in the attempted overthrow and
since 1961 has been infiltrating North Vietnam Army units to assist in the
destruction of the GVN. This natural hesitancy was augmented by the fact
that the newly installed military government of Nguyen Cao Ky had no politi-
cal base in the democratic sense of the word. His political foundation was
built on anti-Communist army support. To have agreed to meet with the NLF
or the DRV to discuss their grievances at that time would have appeared as a
reward for aggression and equally important, probably would have resulted in
an anti-Ky coup. Furthermore, the country-wide military situation in 1965,
which was desperate, would have placed the GVN at a disadvantage in any
negotiations. Thus, the RVN stand was that there could be no negotiations
as long as the NLF remained armed and the NVA was present in South Vietnam.
Rather, the RVN would fight and defeat that aggression:
We must defeat the Viet Cong and those illegally fighting
with them on our soil. We are the victims of an aggres-
sion directed and supported from Hanoi... the defeat of
that aggression is vital for the future of our people of
South Vietnam. 20
20
Joint U.S. -RVN Communique at the conclusion of the Honolulu Conference,
New York Times, 2 September 1966, p. 16.

44
The United States of America
The United States has long viewed Southeast Asia as an area of vast
strategic isiportance. It is an area rich in natural resources with a com-
manding position athwart the East-West lines of communication between the
Orient and Europe and between the West Coast of the Americas and India and
the East Coast of Africa. Should Communist China or any single nation
dominate this vast strategic region the balance of power in the Pacific and
perhaps the world could be upset. The tremendous natural wealth of South-
east Asia could compensate for the resource deficiency within China facili-
tating a tremendous expansion of the CPR economy. The importance of the
area to the United States is illustrated by the fact that many consider it
21directly responsible for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
In the background of the Vietnamese conflict the U.S. has seen the CPR
lurking and plotting the eventual control of all of Southeast Asia. This
American concern was voiced by the then Secretary of Defense McNamara in an
address in Washington on 26 March 1964:
For Peking, however, Hanoi's victory would be only
a first step toward eventual Chinese hegemony over
the two Vietnams and Southeast Asia, and towards
exploitation of the new strategy, conquest by wars
of national liberation, in other parts of the world.
21
The U.S., to prevent Japanese expansion in this direction, imposed a
series of economic sanctions on American exports to Japan, especially
petroleum products. The Japanese deprived of their major source of petro-
leum needed a secure source in order to continue their war against China.
To gain that source the Japanese Fleet struck the American Fleet at Pearl
Harbor to eliminate American Naval power in the Pacific and permit Japanese
expansion into the Southeast Asian area, which is rich in natural resources,
and particularly the oil fields in the Indonesian Archipelago.
22
„R. S. McNamara, In Response to Aggression," in Fall and Raskin, The
Vietnam Reader, p. 197.
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Another underlying concern is that should this war of national libera-
tion in Vietnam prove successful—if the free world forces were defeated
—
that it might become the model for Communist, particularly, Chinese expan-
sion elsewhere. Thus the long shadow of possible CPR ambitions falls upon
Vietnam and is articulated later in the same speech:
...Peking thus appears to feel that it has a large
stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using
Vietnam as a test case. Success in Vietnam would
be regarded by Peking as vindication for China's
views in the world-wide ideological struggle. 23
That one of the United States' objectives in Vietnam was the defeat of the
national wars of liberation strategy was clearly implied in that speech.
Subsequent statements by President Johnson reinforced that interpretation.
In the deepening Vietnam crisis of the early 1960's, President Kennedy
set into motion events which would make eventual direct American involvement
if not inevitable, at least likely. The number of U.S. advisors to the ARVN
was step by step increased from 689 in 1960 to approximately 10,000 in 1962.
^
While U.S. units were not technically engaged in the war, the already massive
U.S. military commitment made withdrawal from the battle without a tremendous,
perhaps crippling, blow to national pride and international confidence in the
world wide U.S. security guarantees almost impossible. President Kennedy com-
mitted additional American military manpower specifically to prevent a Com-
munist victory in South Vietnam:
The United States for more than a decade has been
assisting the Government and people of Vietnam to
maintain their independence. . .Article IV (SEAT0)




Associated Press Release of 24 May 1969 appearing in the Seattle
Times, 26 May 1969, p. A-l.
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by means of armed attack against Vietnam could
threaten our own security .. .We are attempting to
prevent a Communist take-over in Vietnam.
.
.25
This statement invoking Article IV of the SEATO Pact affirmed the fact that
the United States considered the SEATO Pact binding in the case of Vietnam.
As we have seen the military and political situation in South Vietnam
had become, by the early spring of 1965, desperate. The only action which
could prevent a Communist, or if you prefer NLF/DRV, victory in the South
within a very short period of time was the commitment of substantial U.S.
combat elements. As difficult as it might be at this date to imagine, the
vast majority of Americans, in 1965, approved President Johnson's approach
to the solution of the problems in Southeast Asia. While the prospects of
war are never well received in the United States, an unconditional with-
drawal or failure to prevent a Communist takeover in Vietnam would have been
at variance with the tempo of the times.
25
From the text of President J. F. Kennedy's 13 February 1962 news con-
ference, published in full in the New York Times
,
14 February 1962, p. 14.
? ft
On a variety of questions the national public opinion polls indicated,
in late 1964 and 1965, general support for U.S. Vietnam policy while reject-
ing the calls for unilateral American withdrawal. 83% of the electorate
approved of the retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam following the
attacks on the American destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf in August of 1964; New
York Times, 23 February 1965, p. 9. The same poll indicated that the American
public felt that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a Communist victory in
Vietnam with only 17% disagreeing. Just after President Johnson's Johns
Hopkins Speech committing American combat elements to the war, 57% of the
public polled supported the President's policy and handling of the war; New
York Times
, 27 April 1965, p. 1. When the President upped the ceiling of
American troops in Vietnam to over 125,000 in July 1965 the new ceiling was
considered less than the public was prepared to accept at least as indicated




On April 7, 1965 President Johnson explained why Americans were
fighting in his first major policy speech following the commitment of U.S.
combat elements to the struggle:
We fight because we must fight if we are to live
in a world where every country can shape its own
destiny, and only in such a world will our own free-
dom be finally secure...
Of course, some of the people of South Vietnam
are participating in the attack on their own govern-
ment. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms,
flow in a constant stream from North to South...
We are also there to strengthen world order. Around
the globe... are people whose well being rests in part on
the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked.
To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of
all these people in the value of America's word. The
result would be increased unrest and instability, and
even wider war.
After having discussed the reasons for the American involvement, the Presi-
dent then went on to outline the U.S. objectives in Vietnam:
Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and
its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves
—
only that the people of South Viet-Name be allowed to
guide their own country in their own way...
And we do this to convince the leaders of North
Vietnam—securely and all who seek to share their con-
quest—of a simple fact:
We will not be defeated.
We will not grow tired.
We will not withdraw, either openly or under the
cloak of a meaningless agreement.
Such peace demands an independent South Vietnam
—
securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relation-
ships to all others—free from outside interference— tied
to no alliance— a military base for no other country. 27
Quite plainly, President Johnson defined the American objective in
Vietnam as the independence of South Vietnam and the guaranteed freedom of
that country from outside attack. This American determination to preserve
27
New York Times, 8 April 1965, p. 16.
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the independence of South Vietnam was in direct conflict with the principal
objective of the DRV, namely the reunification of Vietnam and the NLF's
goal of overthrowing the GVN. Given the basic conflict of interest on the
central issues the prospects for peace were, during the static political
period from March 1965 to February 1968, dim.
The 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements
The breakdown of the two previous agreements for peace in Southeast
Asia will have an effect on all the parties concerned in any attempt to
reach a negotiated settlement of the present conflict.
Failure of the United States and the State of Vietnam to consent to
the 1954 Agreements was a powerful stimulus towards disorder. The sub-
sequent American encouragement of Diem not to permit the unification
elections called for in the unsigned Final Declaration to the 1954 Con-
ference could be considered a major cause of the Second Indochina War.
Barring the elections removed any chance of peaceful unification of Vietnam.
Since the DRV has always viewed Vietnam as a single entity and was deter-
mined to have a united Vietnam, force would, in the end, be attempted as the
unification device.
The inability of any of the signatories or the International Commission
for the Supervision and Control to compel compliance with either the 1954 or
the 1962 Agreement tends to discredit negotiated settlements in this area.
Some of the major violations are:
a. The 1956 South Vietnamese refusal to permit unification elections
as called for in the Final Declaration of the 1954 Agreements. 28
28
President Deim's statement regarding country-wide elections between




b. In March 1957 the Diem regime openly violated the last restraints
still in effect from the 1954 Agreements with the initiations of
a program of reprisals against "former resistance members" that
is, former Vietminh.29
c. The 2 June ICC finding that North Vietnam was sending arms, muni-
tions and men to fight in South Vietnam, and that the People's
Army of Vietnam (NVA) had allowed the DRV to be used for the pur-
pose of overthrowing the government in South Vietnam. 30
d. Article II of the 1962 Agreements calls for "all foreign troops,
foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para-military
formations and foreign military personnel" to be withdrawn from
Laos within 30 days. This has not been accomplished. Of the
thousands of North Vietnamese troops in Laos at the time of agree-
ment, less than 100 checked out of the country at the official ICC
check points and by July 1966 there were an estimated 40,000 NVA
troops in Laos.^l
In all of these cases the ICC was without the requisite military or political
power or recourse to sufficient power to force observance of the Agreements.
Peace under the 1954 and 1962 Agreements was wholly dependent on the good
will and voluntary compliance of the principles. The ICC was and is com-
pletely powerless to enforce the Agreements. The Commission can simply
report the most flagrant violations to those who already know of the viola-
tions: the perpetrator and the victim. The effect of world opinion as a
deterrent to violation has, in Southeast Asia, proved to be valueless.
29
B. B. Fall, "Viet Cong—The Unseen Enemy in Vietnam," in Fall and








P. F. Langer and J. J. Zasloff, The North Vietnamese Military Advisor
in Laos: A First Hand Account (Santa Monica, Calif. : Rand Corporation,
1968) . This theme is developed throughout this short Rand Memorandum.
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MOSCOW AND THE WAR
Complicating an already complex issue is the fact that the Vietnam War
plays a central role in the Sino-Soviet rift. The war has become a pawn in
the chess game being played by China and the Soviets for leadership within
the Communist World. Each is trying to establish the "correctness" of its
own ideology and strategy.
In January 1961 Nikita Khrushchev, while reaffirming the Soviet policy
of "peaceful coexistence" said the Soviets would, as well, support "just wars
of national liberation":
...liberation wars will continue to exist as long
as imperialism exists. . .Such wars are not only admis-
sible but inevitable, since the colonialists do not
grant independence voluntarily .. .It is a liberation
war of a people for its independence, it is a sacred
war. We recognize such wars, we help and will help
the peoples striving for their independence. ..
1
The Soviets have placed the greater emphasis on the peaceful coexistence
phase in their foreign policy or, actually it would be more correct to say,
they have placed less emphasis on the wars of national liberation than the
CPR has.
While the Soviets have maintained that revolution by armed force is not
always necessary, Mao has held that in the last analysis force will always
have to be used to complete the revolution. To support this thesis the CPR
published the text of a secret memorandum they had sent to the Soviets con-
cerning the Soviet thesis that parliamentary seizure was preferable to the
open use of force:
It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics
to refer to the desire for peaceful transition (of a
Communist party to power). But... they must be
Critchfield, The Long Charade, p. 51, citing a speech made by the Soviet
leader, Nikita S. Khrushchev, in January, 1961.
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prepared at all times to repulse counter-
revolutionary attacks and, at the critical
juncture of the revolution when the working
class is seizing state power, to overthrow the
bourgeoisie by armed force if it uses armed
force to suppress the people's revolution:
generally speaking, it is inevitable that the
bourgeoisie will do so.
2
The intended message was clear: that the advocacy of the peaceful transi-
tion to power could be used only as a ploy to deceive the bourgeoisie but
in actually seizing power the Communists would have to resort to armed force.
The CPR has long been the most outspoken advocate of the people's wars
of national liberation as the best means of expanding the Communist area of
domination. The people's wars offer the means for a less powerful adversary,
with little or no risk to the Communist government supporting the insurgency,
to overthrow non-Communist governments.
While the Vietnam War remained a localized affair only indirectly in-
volving the United States both the CPR and the Soviet Union could pay lip
service to the NLF and "support" the war of liberation being fought in South
Vietnam. There was no apparent danger of being called upon to deliver actual
or material assistance to the insurgents. However, this complacency was
shattered when, in August 1964, the United States initiated retaliatory air
strikes against North Vietnam in retribution for the North Vietnamese PT
boat attacks on American destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf. These air strikes
demonstrated an alarming (at least to the Soviets and the CPR) American
willingness to use armed force and, in particular, a U.S. willingness to
assault the guerrilla's privileged sanctuary which had, heretofore been
inviolate. Quite suddenly the war in Vietnam was no longer one which Moscow
2
Ibid
, p. 51-52, citing the text of a CPR governmental news release.
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and Peking could, willy-nilly, support without any real obligations to pro-
duce some visible assistance for North Vietnam and the southern insurgents.
Those air attacks were the source of acute embarrassment on the part
of the Soviets since, as the leader of the socialist camp they have the
same obligation to defend their fold as the United States does in the Free
World. The Soviets had no intention of directly confronting the U.S. in
Vietnam; yet, barring that course, how could they prevent the devastation of
North Vietnam by aerial assault? They could attempt to influence the U.S.
to halt the bombing and talk peace, try to persuade the DRV to enter negoti-
ations while still under attack or find some mutually agreeable middle ground
between the two.
The gravity of the situation can be measured indirectly by the Soviet
response to the invitation of the DRV to the UN following the Tonkin Gulf
attacks. Rather than assaulting the U.S. in a propaganda broadside the
Soviets maintained a measured silence while supporting the DRV. While the
DRV refused to come and proclaimed that only the signatories to the 1954
Geneva Agreements could decide the fate of Southeast Asia, it is of con-
siderable significance that the Soviets were attempting, even at this early
date, to remove the struggle from the explosive battlefield environment to
the conference table.
In any efforts to arrange or even to acquiesce to a negotiated settle-
ment in Vietnam the USSR must tread a very thin line between supporting and
assisting a fellow socialist state under direct American attack and pressur-




8 August 1964, p. 1.
A
Ibid, 10 August 1964, p. 1.
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Sino-Soviet rift is basically over means not ends, the Soviets cannot afford
to appear to be supporting the American position or to be lagging the CPR in
support of a beleaguered socialist state. To do so would jeopardize the al-
ready threatened Soviet leadership position in the Communist World. Thus
the Soviets have developed a parallel approach to the Vietnamese War. On
the one hand the Soviet Union has become the primary supplier of war material
to the North Vietnamese, especially sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons
systems wuch as air search radar, radar controlled anti-aircraft guns, sur-
face to air missiles, limited numbers of interceptor aircraft and communica-
tions and control equipment.
At this point it is illustrative to note that the Soviet shipments of
war materials contain mostly weapons for the defense of North Vietnam. The
CPR, although supplying less aid, in monetary terms, provides that
assistance in the form of infantry weapons such as AK-47 assault rifles,
RPG—2 and RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, 57mm and 75mm recoiless rifles, 61mm,
82mm and 120mm and 120mm mortars and large caliber artillery rockets. In
other words by by supplying air defense weapons systems the Soviets con-
tribute to the defense of North Vietnam while the Chinese support, in a more
direct and visible manner, the southern insurgency with large shipments of
individual infantry weapons. Even while providing Hanoi with extensive
5
Ibid, 28 October 1966, p. 1.
By the end of 1966 Soviet military assistance had built up the DRV air
defense system from virtually nothing to an integrated system of over 7,000
anti-aircraft guns, many of which are radar directed, 200 surface to air
missile sites equipped with 4,500 missiles, an air force of 120 jet fighters
and a coordinated radar surveillance/ communications network for detection,
command and control and fighter direction. These figures were made public
by Representative Melvin Laird and were read into the Congressional Record
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military assistance, the Soviets have attempted to exercise a moderating
influence in Hanoi in an effort to get the DRV to reach some agreement with
the U.S. which would lead to an American bombing cessation and peace
negotiations.
In October of 1966 Moscow called an unscheduled conference to coordinate
aid to the DRV. The CPR boycotted this conference but the European Bloc
countries and the Soviets agreed to provide Hanoi with $1 billion in military
aid. Of equal importance to the aid itself was the agreement of the attend-
ing parties:
...that it would be desirable for Hanoi to go to a
peace conference and to make such a conference pos-
sible by helping to create the condition that would
lead to a halt in the American bombing...
7
on 30 March 1967; New York Times , 31 March 1967, p. 3. Harrison Salisbury
while visiting North Vietnam learned from foreign diplomats stationed in
Hanoi that Soviet supplies were made up almost entirely of heavy armament
with attendant munitions, air search and fire direction radar, MIG aircraft,
surface to air missile systems with the appropriate electronic equipment,
motor transport and petroleum products. The same sources relayed that CPR
assistance was generally in the form of construction battalions, food stuffs
and light, or infantry, weapons and munitions; New York Times
,
17 January
1967, p. 14. In other words the Soviets are the principal suppliers of
defensive weapons systems for the protection of North Vietnam while the
Chinese are the major suppliers of the NLF's weapons and munitions. The
wording of the Soviet-DRV communique at the conclusion of the assistance
agreement for 1969 emphasized the civilian character of much of the aid and
even the military assistance was that which was "needed for the building up
of the defense and strengthening of the economy of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam." New York Times , 28 November 1968, p. 12.
As a personal sidelight, in the one year, from October, 1967 to October
1968, that this writer spent in the Republic of Vietnam as the Chief Staff
Officer to Commander, River Assault Squadron Nine and as Commander, River
Assault Division Ninety Two, of the tons of enemy equipment the squadron
and my division captured in the Mekong Delta every B-40 and B-41 rocket
round and launchers, 57mm and 75mm recoiless rifle and projectile, mortar tube
and round and AK-47 assault rifle was of Chinese not Soviet manufacture.
New York Times
, 28 October 1966, p. 17.
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What of course makes this statement significant is the call upon Hanoi to
take steps to permit the United States to stop the bombing. Instead of lay-
ing all the blame for the expanded war in the American lap, Hanoi is
encouraged to share some of the responsibility. Clearly implied is Hanoi
could contribute to a peaceful solution by reducing the infiltration rate to
South Vietnam since that was the principle, public reason the U.S. gave for
the bombing campaign.
The Soviets have been in heavy flak from the CPR for their moderate
stance on Vietnam. China has consistently charged that the Soviets were
providing insufficient material assistance in comparison to the overall
Soviet capability and that the assistance provided has been composed of old
and obsolete equipment while at the same time the Soviets were trying to
undermine the solidarity of the Vietnamese and Chinese people. This recur-
ring theme is typified by an article in the 24 December 1965 Peking Review:
Whether or not a socialist country firmly supports
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the South Vietnamese
National Liberation Front.
.
.whether or not it constantly
exposes and combats the peace talks scheme of U.S. imperial-
ists.
.
.whether or not it genuinely gives the Vietnamese
people effective and practical support. .. constitutes an
important criteria.
.




If a person covertly conspires with U.S. imperialism
while giving some superficial aid to the Vietnamese people,
if he actually sows discord in an attempt to undermine
Vietnamese people's unity against U.S. aggression and the
unity of Vietnamese and Chinese peoples. . .while professing...
to right imperialism. . .then he is ... capitalizing on the





24 December 1965, p. 4. Responding to this form of
CPR attack the Soviets have not concentrated on U.S. "aggression" in
Vietnam but rather have drawn attention to the fact that for all their
vocal support of the DRV/NLF the Chinese have consistently evaded more
direct involvement to protect North Vietnam from American assaults. This
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The low risk policy of avoiding direct confrontation with the U.S. is
viewed in Moscow as having the best chance of success in contrast to the
high risk, direct US-USSR confrontation policy advocated by the CPR. (It
is important to note the CPR high risk policy involves US-USSR and no US-
CPR confrontation policy advocated by the CPR.) This Soviet view is more
pronounced now that the U.S. is directly involved in the war.
Rather than increasing tensions elsewhere to relive the pressure in
Vietnam, as advocated by Peking, the Soviet's "correct" strategy and the
one offering the best opportunity for success is to reduce international
tensions which will lead to a more permissive American attitude:
...a policy aimed at strengthening world socialism,
the active struggle against imperialism. .. the imple-
mentation of the Leninist principle of peaceful co-
existence of states with different social systems,...
and the securing of a peaceful international atmosphere
increase the opportunity for the victorious development
of the class struggle.
.
.including through national wars
of liberation.
When referring to the solution of Southern problems the editorial advocates
the South Vietnamese people solve their own problems without mention of the
key phraseology "in accordance with the NLF's program." Also while the
Vietnamese people will "defend" their just cause there is no bugle call to
victory or the defeat of the United States.
aspect of Chinese inconsistency was commented on in the editorial section of
Investia, 21 September 1966, "...on the one hand they try to impose on
fraternal parties a course that would lead... ultimately to war... On the
other, they remain on the sidelines of the struggle against imperialism...
We have not seen any Chinese presence in the Vietnam conflict."
9
Pravada, 7 December 1966, editorial.

57
In April 1968, following President Johnson's decision to halt the bomb-
ing of the Northern portion of North Vietnam, the Soviets, in direct contrast
with the CPR, supported the DRV decision to negotiate:
The Soviet Government fully supports this statement of
the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in
the belief that this indicates a realistic way of ending
the war in Vietnam, to a political settlement in the
interests of the Vietnamese people.-^
Although generally supporting the DRV/NLF negotiating stands, the Soviets
have shown themselves to be more interested in a setttlement than on
rigidly applying every aspect of the DRV's and NLF's Four and Five Point
demands for a negotiated settlement of the war:
...further development. . .depends on whether the U.S. will
take the following steps: whether it stops bombing un-
conditionally .. .whether it takes a positive view of the
well known proposals of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
on ways of settling the Vietnamese conflict. ^
Calling on the U.S. to take a "positive view" of the NLF/DRV proposals
implies that, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the outright accept-
ance of those proposals is not necessarily required. Rather, they "offer a
12
good basis for a lasting settlement in Vietnam. ' The Soviets do not, at
any point, say that these proposals form the only basis for agreement.
The most pressing Soviet objective in Vietnam, although through no
action directly attributable to the USSR, was achieved on 1 November 1968
when the United States suspended all air and naval bombardment of North
Vietnam. Finally, the devastating American attacks against North Vietnam,
°New York Times






which the USSR was incapable of preventing or defending against were lifted.
An official government statement hailed the cessation and expanded peace
13
talks as "an important success along the road to a peace settlement."
While crediting the progress in Paris to the DRV and the "Vietnamese," the
statement contained none of the anti-American viperations which had high-
lighted the DRV reaction to the bombing halt.
In what could have hardly been coincidental timing, the Soviets invited
the U.S. to confer with the USSR on ways to normalize relations between the
two countries. In a speech made in behalf of the Politburo, on 6 November
1968, the First Deputy Premier Mazurov referred to the normalization of
relations twice, indicating the importance attached to the subject:
. .
.we have expressed readiness to conduct negotiations
with the United States on the entire range of these
problems. But their positive solution does not depend
on the Soviet Union alone. ...we have always attached
great importance to the normalization of relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States, which
would be important not only to both our countries but
also to world peace."
The speech was delivered less than one week after the bombing halt which lends
credence to the supposition that it was intended as a conciliatory gesture
to encourage the further United States concessions in the pursuit of peace
through negotiations instead of on the battlefields of Vietnam.
A further signal of the Soviet desire to solve world problems in general
and the Vietnamese conflict in particular by negotiations in contrast to the
use of armed force was provided in the Moscow May Day 1969 parade. For the
first time the massive display of Soviet military hardware and the review of
Ibid
, 3 November 1968, p. 5.
1
Ibid
» 7 November 1968, p. 1.

59
long columns of Soviet troops had been replaced by a civilian march. The
reviewing stand was filled, not with the usual bevy of high ranking military
officers, but with civilians. Brezhnev, in his May Day speech declared that
the Soviets were ready for peaceful coexistence with all countries. He urged
that all conflicts be settled at the conference table. Even the annual
condemnations of the United States, the Federal German Republic and Israel
were not included in the speech.
Conclusion
The Soviet Union has, of the four Communist elements involved in
Vietnam, taken the least "hawkish" stand. The USSR is caught in an un-
pleasant quandry. If they take too soft a line they come under fire for
not opposing U.S. imperialism. If, on the other hand, the Soviets are too
hawkish, the risk of a direct confrontation with the U.S. rises to an un-
acceptable level. The Soviet leadership has concluded that with the U.S.
present in Vietnam there is virtually no chance of the rebel movement achiev-
ing the destruction of the RVN. Given that assumption, the wisest Soviet
move then becomes a negotiated settlement achieving at least some of the in-
surgents' objectives. However, the Soviets can not appear to be forcing the
DRV/NLF to accept an unsatisfactory peace settlement from the US/RVN and
still maintain their pre-eminent leadership position within the Communist
World in the face of the strong CPR challenge. Therefore, the Soviets main-
tain the U.S. must take a "positive view of the well known proposals" of the
DRV and the NLF. This stand leaves the door open to the US/RVN that they
might not have to accept all the Communist proposals while at the same time
5
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demonstrating general support for the DRV/NLF objectives. Offering this
general support of objectives and the continued massive supply of war
material to the DRV the USSR protects its ideological flanks from Chinese
attack.
Equally important, the USSR is not anxious to see an overwhelming NLF
victory or an unconditional U.S. withdrawal since such eventualities would
vindicate the CPR strategy that the U.S. is indeed a "paper tiger" which can
be defeated anywhere by people's war of national liberation. With the ces-
sation of the bombing of the North the sense of urgency in Vietnam, from the
Soviet perspective, has vanished. In fact, with shooting disagreements along
their frontier with China the Soviets probably do not view the continued U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, forcing the deployment of powerful Chinese defensive
forces in Southeastern China, as wholly unsatisfactory.

IV
PEKING AND THE WAR
The Chinese People's Republic has been cast as dangerously radical and
revolutionary in their foreign policy and particularly so in relation to the
conflict in Vietnam. While not disagreeing that the CPR is, in principle,
an ardent proponant of revolution and wars of national liberation, I submit
that an examination of the facts will show that the aggressive foreign policy
with which they are credited has been largely limited to the verbal battle
with the Soviet Union. In reality the CPR has carefully tempered their
foreign policy with caution especially when dealing in an area in which the
U.S. has a direct interest such as Vietnam.
In spite of claiming a victory in the Korean War the Chinese People's
Liberation Army had been roughly handled along the 38th parallel by the
American armed forces. There is every reason for the Chinese to believe
that future conflicts with the United States would be equally costly and
painful experiences. The fear of American involvement in the First Indo-
china War led to the Chinese urging the DRV to accept a less than satisfactory
2
solution to that conflict.
As the Viet Cong-led insurgency developed in South Vietnam, Chinese sup-
port was painless and without risk to the CPR security. As direct American
involvement became more and more likely the ante and stakes went up consider-
ably for China since a conflict in such close proximity to Chinese frontiers
M. B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How we Met the Challenge (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) pp. 110-17 and p. 244.
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in which American forces were actively engaged, significantly increased the
risk of a direct confrontation between the CPR and the U.S.
Playing on America's own bitter experiences and frustrations in the
Korean War with the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the CPR in a series
of editorials appearing during the Spring and Summer of 1964 in Jen-min
Jeh-pao and one in the North Vietnamese theoretical periodical, Hoc Tap,
warned that U.S. intervention in Vietnam would lead to involvement with the
3
CPR. Following the U.S. retaliatory airstrikes in reprisal for the PT boat
attacks in August 1964, but before the introduction of American combat forma-
tions, China promised to send "Volunteers" and actually delivered some obso-
4
lete fighter aircraft to the DRV. As is now well known these CPR warnings
did not have the desired effect of preventing U.S. intervention in the war.
The round the clock bombing campaign against North Vietnam and the
deployment of U.S. ground troops to South Vietnam initiated in the Spring of
1965 were colossal setbacks for the CPR just as they had been for the Soviet
Union. Her southern neighbor and nominal ally was being subjected to a
massive aerial assault which was destroying the industrial and transportation
facilities of North Vietnam. China was powerless to prevent the devastation.
An unsatisfactory by-product of these developments was the Soviet Union's
involvement in an area which China has always viewed as her own bailiwick.
Even more alarming was the U.S. decision to bomb the North Vietnamese sanc-
tuary which was a logistic center and base of operations for the war in the
3
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South. This was a sharp break from the unwritten rule of privileged sanc-
tuary in limited conflicts. There had been no bombing or assaults on
Germany or Italy during the Spanish Civil War, on Yugoslavia during the
Greek insurgency, China during the First Indochina War or North Vietnam in
the Laotian struggle during the early 1960's. Now, in a most frightening
manner, the United States appeared bent on destroying the North Vietnamese
sanctuary. By extension then, if the U.S. was willing to bomb North Vietnam
for assisting the war in South Vietnam, would the U.S. not be equally will-
ing to bomb China for assisting North Vietnam? This question touched off
an extensive debate in the CPR over priorities in Southeast Asia. The
increasingly heavy aerial assault threatened the security of the DRV and the
introduction of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam threatened not only the
the success but also the existence of the revolution in the South.
They key question, from the Chinese perspective, centered upon the
resolution of which was more important: the survival of a secure and viable
Communist buffer state on China's southern frontier or the pursuit of revo-
lutionary victory in South Vietnam. The answer was both.
To preserve the DRV, the CPR made a major concession to the Soviet Union
signing a trade protocol with the USSR permitting the flow across China by
rail of Soviet war supplies to the DRV. With that assistance, of course,
went Soviet influence into an area traditionally viewed by China as a Chinese
preserve. Apparently, the Chinese leadership felt the sustenance of North
Vietnam in the face of U.S. aerial devastation was of sufficient gravity to
warrent an increase in Soviet influence within the DRV. Without this agree-
ment, the Soviet's only avenue of supply to the DRV was through Haiphong,




whose approaches were controlled by the same U.S. Navy which had confronted
and thwarted the Soviets off Cuba just three years before. Chinese strategy
evidently assumed massive Soviet assistance would deter the U.S. from seek-
ing the political destruction of the DRV. With the political safety of the
DRV reasonably secure the CPR sought to lessen the possibility of a Sin-
American clash. The CPR backed off from their previous threat to send
"volunteers" to fight with North Vietnam if the United States refused to
desist from aggression. Instead, by early 1965, China was only "ready" to
send "men" if asked to do so.
The rapid, large scale build-up of American ground elements in South
Vietnam during the summer of 1965 caused mounting concern in Peking, Hanoi
and the NLF's jungle headquarters. The DRV and NLF, in spite of the tremen-
dous American firepower, did not fundamentally change tactics with the American
appearance. The anti-GVN forces chose to remain in Phase III, a conventional
war of maneuver, to counter U.S. intervention. To support this massive
military effort required conscription of South Vietnamese peasants, the
abandonment of some of the more politicized stratagems employed in Phase II,
and, most important, substantial, direct North Vietnamese assistance to the
Southern guerrillas; first, in the form of arms, then supporting NVA military
formations, then NVA combat formations and finally, because of staggering
casualties, direct NVA replacements to Viet Cong units.
After several months of relative silence the CPR attacked this strategy
as incorrect. In September 1965 Lin Piao, the Chinese Defense Minister, in
a major speech, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," admonished the DRV
and NLF to revert to the more politicized approach to the war of Phase II or
Jen-min Jeh-pao
,
29 March 1965, editorial.

65
even Phase I of Giap's blue print for guerrilla warfare. Lin refers to the
PLA's defeat of Japan and the KMT by this form of warfare which compensated
for the lack of firepower compared to the Japanese and KMT formations. The
inference was clearly that with the introduction of U.S. units with their
vastly superior firepower, the DRV/NLF should not continue to seek a rapid
solution to the war by attempting to defeat the U.S. in conventional
battles.
Lin argued that since the introduction of U.S. elements had altered the
balance of forces in South Vietnam, the guerrillas should avoid contact with
the superior U.S. formations while wearing down the enemy's will to resist
in a protracted guerrilla, not conventional, struggle:
Guerrilla warfare is the only way to mobilize and
apply the whole strength of the people, the only way
to expand our forces in the course of the war, deplete
and weaken the enemy, gradually change the balance of
forces (and)
. . .
switch from guerrilla to mobilize war-
fare, and finally defeat the enemy.
°
In Peking's view the DRV/NLF strategy of mobile warfare was not consistent
with reality. The guerrilla's must rely on their own small unit tactical
superiority to gradually shift the balance of forces. In pursuing this
objective they must be self-reliant and without dependence on outside assist-
ance.
Rather than everywhere attempting to oppose the enemy, as the DRV/NLF
were, the guerrilla must instead, according to Lin Piao, fight only carefully
planned battles of annihilation where the guerrilla units, through rapid con-
centration, achieve overwhelming local fire superiority:
A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically
decisive in a contest with a force of great strength.
Q
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A battle of annihilation produces a great and immediate
impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man's ten
fingers is not as effective as chopping one off, and
routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as
annihilating one of them."
Equally important the gradual de-escalation might lead to a departure
from the war of the American units. This theme received continuing Jen-min
Jeh-pao editorial exposure during August, September and October 1966 which
indicates the importance attached to the reduction of the level of violence,
not for its own sake, but for the security of China by reducing the oppor-
tunities for a US-CPR confrontation.
As was to be expected the DRV reaction to Lin's speech was negative.
The first indication of disapproval was that the text of this major Chinese
policy statement was never published in North Vietnam. Hanoi, instead, pub-
lished counter arguments, based on the DRV's own revolutionary heritage, that
the U.S. would be defeated a la Diem Bien Phu by remaining on the offensive.
In direct answer to Lin Piao's call for a strategic retreat Le Duan replied:
It is not fortuitous that in the history of our country,
each time we rose to oppose foreign aggression, we took
the offensive and not the defensive. . .Taking the offen-
sive is a strategy, while taking the defensive is only
a strategem.
.
.We do not disregard foreign countries'
weaponry and technology, but we have to know how to apply
the. .. technology , but we have to know how to apply the...
techniques which are suitable to our country's situation
and characteristics and to our combat methods.10
In other words Hanoi was telling Peking and others to supply the welcomed
material assistance but they had best leave the strategy to the DRV leader-
ship.
While interested in confining the conflict to South Vietnam, China is






in fact, a defeat for the United States. Efforts from all quarters to get
peace talks started on the Vietnam issue have consistently come under heavy
Chinese attack as "frauds" and "tricks" to disguise U.S. aggression. The
Jen-min Jeh-pao editorial of 14 October 1966. "Expose the Big Fraud of
Inducing Peace Talks Through the Suspension of Bombing," attacks the concept
of negotiations which are designed as a trick to fool the Vietnamese people
and urges the Vietnamese to continue the fight since the only argument the
U.S. understands is the argument of force:
...The two parties (the U.S. and the Soviet Union) were
fraternizing like real brothers .. .The result was a big
crop of assorted 'peace talks' plans.
. .Everything points
to a new and large scale 'peace offensive' over the
Vietnam question by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism.
...Appealing for peace without differentiating right from
wrong, echoing the U.S. deception of 'inducing peace talks
by a cessation of bombing' and letting the U.S. intrigue of
using the U.N. prevail, will only end in rendering service
to the U.S. and the Soviet revisionist 'peace talk' con-
spiracy and in encouraging the United States to widen still
further its aggressive war in Vietnam...
Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out the impossibility of
persuading the imperialists 'to show kindness of heart and
turn from their evil ways'. The only course is to organize
forces and struggle against them... The Vietnamese people are
invincible. U.S. imperialism is doomed to final defeat no
matter what 'peace talk' trickery it may resort to or what
military adventure it may plot.l-'-
The CPR continued to oppose peace talks through President Johnson's
announcement of the partial bombing halt of North Vietnam which the CPR
labeled as a "smoke screen" for further escalation on the part of the United
States:
...peace will return to Vietnam only after the Vietnamese
people win victories in the battlefield and drive the U.S.
aggressors out. 12
lx
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There occurred at some point between April and November 1968 a funda-
mental shift in policy or at least emphasis in Peking. In marked contrast
to the violent attacks on the alleged connivance to defraud the South
Vietnamese people by the U.S. and Soviet revisionists which had followed past
peace efforts in Vietnam, the Chinese press published, without comment, the
13
DRV announcement of expanded peace talks in Paris. The lack of Chinese
comment—although the DRV statement claimed the expanded talks were a vic-
tory for the DRV/NLF which had been forced upon the Americans by defeats
suffered in the war—was either an attempt to disassociate China from any
peace which might emerge or a decision that a negotiated settlement might
serve CPR interests.
Supporting the thesis that China is seeking a negotiated settlement is
the fact that since Han Emperor Wu Ti's rule during the second century B.C.
China has viewed Indochina as a Chinese satellite area. Should the DRV
establish domination over the vast Indochina resource base, China, instead of
facing a group of small factionated states, would be next door to a powerful
rival. Negotiations might result in a Western oriented South Vietnam but
almost certainly will not result in a unified Vietnam. Conversely, continua-
tion on the battlefield might eventually result in a war weary U.S. with-
drawal leading to DRV dominance in Indochina. The U.S. might, out of
frustration, expand the war in an effort to achieve a military solution. Both
of these represent unsatisfactory contingencies for the CPR which points to
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because of the CPR ideological commitment to national wars of liberation
it will be unable to publically support negotiations which, in this case,
are unlikely to result in an unqualified victory for anyone much less for
the NLF.
Also lending credence to the change of CPR orientation on Vietnam was
the Chinese request on November 26th, 1968 for a resumption of Ambassadorial
level discussions in Warsaw which would lead to a Sino-American peaceful co-
existence Pact. These discussions between China and America would be based
on two principles:
First, the United States Government. . .immediately with-
drew all its armed forces from China's Taiwan Province
and the Taiwan Straights and to dismantle all its
military installations in the Taiwan Province.
Second, the United States Government agrees that China
and the United States conclude an agreement on the five
principles of coexistence.-'--'
This request was received with some surprise since the peaceful coexistence
theme had been under attack as a revisionistic "fraud" perpetrated by a
US-USSR conspiracy. While it is true that at the last minute the Chinese
backed out claiming the CIA had spirited off a CPR diplomat in the
Netherlands (actually he was in charge of CPR intelligence activities in
Western Europe and had defected to the United States) the fact remains that
talks were proposed and those talks would have had the object of a Sino-
American freemen t based on peaceful coexistence instead of continuing conflict,
Since the 1 November bombing halt the CPR anti-American propaganda barrage has
decreased. The attacks still published have been noticeably less shrill.
New York Times, 27 November 1968, p. 1.
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On 2 March 1969 the CPR imposed a total rail blockade on Soviet war
material bound for Vietnam through China. As of mid-July 1969 that block-
ade was till in effect. It is undoubtedly designed to embarass the USSR and
force a curtailment of Soviet influence in Hanoi. With a rail blockade in
effect the only resupply avenue open to the Soviets is the sea. An effort in
this sphere would be hampered by the fact that the Suez Canal is closed, that
Vladivostok is not an all-weather port and a massive seaborn resupply would
operate at the pleasure of the U.S. Fleet.
Equally important to the embarrassment of the Soviets, is the Chinese
demonstration to the DRV that Soviet arms shipments are dependent on CPR
approval and thus force the DRV more into the Peking camp in the struggle
against revisionism. But cutting off the Soviet supplies the CPR may, as
well, be attempting to force the DRV to take a more positive view of a
negotiated settlement or at least an arrangement which results in a with-
drawal of the main impediment to revolutionary victory in the South, massive
U.S. troop concentrations. Without massive Soviet assistance the DRV/NLF
would be unable to continue to prosecute the war in South Vietnam along the
conventional, mobile warfare lines. Thus, by cutting those supplies, the
CPR may be able to dictate in conformance with Lin Piao's September 1965
speech a return to phase II, or a more conventional guerrilla warfare line
which the CPR has been advocating since 1965. Such a de-escalation would
markedly decrease, indeed probably eliminate, the threat of U.S. anti-CPR
action.




The CPR is now interested in a negotiated settlement of the war in
Vietnam providing the revolutionaries are not humiliated in the peace
package. They may be interested in the continuation of a guerrilla struggle
once the U.S. has withdrawn, but for reasons of tactical necessity a negoti-
ated settlement which results in American withdrawal has become the
principle objective of the CPR. However, China may not publically avow such
a stand or appear to be forsaking their ideological support for national
wars of liberation without seriously compromising their position in the
ideological battle with the USSR. Specifically, the CPR is no longer
promising "volunteers" at the drop of a hat, is no longer threatening the
DRV with intervention in case of a "sell out" peace as was the case in 1966,
has reduced the anti-American propaganda and has even proposed a US-CPR
agreement based on peaceful coexistence.
This subtle shift in CPR policy may be based on the increasingly violent
disagreements with the Soviet Union which have recently involved the use of
armed force along the Manchurian- Sinkiang frontiers. The CPR has for some
time been accusing the Soviets and the U.S. of collusion and may actually
fear a Soviet agreement with the U.S. in Europe which would permit the USSR
to concentrate more military power in the Far East to confront the CPR. A
resolution of the Vietnam conflict then, which does not publically compromise
the CPR ideological support for revolution, would be well received in Peking
since it would permit counter-concentration by the Chinese with forces
presently stationed in South Eastern China.




China demonstrated at Geneva in 1954 that it was fully capable, and
indeed inclined, to compromise their support for revolutionary movements if
the international balance of forces indicated that such a move was prudent
and in the best interests of Communist China. Those conditions now exist
for the CPR recovering from the holocaust of the Red Guard movement with a
highly vulnerable nuclear capability facing an increasingly impatient United
States and a hostile Soviet Union. However, any settlement will have to con-
tain at least some basic concessions to the DRV and particularly the NLF.
Lin Piao's speech of 3 September 1965 clearly notified the NLF that they
should not expect any outside help in their revolutionary struggle. Wars of
national liberation must be won by the indigenous population. Thus as long
as the "settlement" does not result in the destruction of the NLF there is
every reason to believe that the CPR will lend its support, through acquies-
cense, to a settlement that will leave the NLF intact and result in the with-
drawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. However, because of the ideological
sensitivity of the Vietnam situation the important sections of any agreement
must be negotiated in secret and indeed must remain secret to retain this
tacit CPR support. Should it appear during the negotiations or come to light
subsequent to any agreement that the NLF had been sacrificed or was not going
to achieve at least some of their fundamental objectives the CPR would be




The massive infusion of American manpower and firepower to the Vietnam
conflict stabilized the deteriorating military situation and by January 1966
there existed a stalemate in South Vietnam. The tremendous U.S. firepower
and unprecedented mobility denied the NLF/URV the ability to achieve local
superiority and administer crushing or annihilating defeats to U.S. elements
as had been the case with the French in the First Indochina War. Since the
new American firepower and mobility was made available to assist the ARVN
,
the DRV/NLF have been unable to maul the ARVN units with the impunity that
they had enjoyed before the entrance of the United States into the war. The
tables on the battlefield had been turned. Since mid-1965, it has been the
DRV/NLF elements which have been severely battered. The RVN/US have, however,
been equally incapable of destroying the insurgents or those who support
them.
In this environment the negotiating positions of the various belligerents
hardened into static, immovable barriers: the only changes were in the flood
of rhetoric. The uncompromising stands were generally led by the United
States and North Vietnam with the RVN and NLF remaining, to a large extent,
silent partners.
The stalemated military situation persisted throughout the remainder of
1965 and, unbelievably, into early 1968. Escalation on one side was met by
In addition to the disaster suffered at Diem Bien Phu the French Union
Forces suffered overwhelming defeats in numerous other battles throughout
Vietnam. For instance, at Plekiu in 1954 a French armored column was
ambushed and very roughly handled by the Vietminh during the next several
days as they struggled to fight their way out of the ambush. In the course





counter-escalation on the other until by February 1968 the conflict had
progressed only to the extent that it had become a gigantic, stationary
bloodbath. American bombers, naval gunfire and artillery were devastating
large areas of North Vietnam including the recently constructed and highly
2
prized industrial projects.
The South Vietnamese countryside was systematically being reduced to
rubble under the constant U.S., RVN, DRV and NLF bombardment. The southern
population was alternately bombed or shelled by the various combatants. The
peasants were herded by the RVN, sometimes against their will, into fortified
hamlets where they were shelled by the DRV/NLF. If left in their own vil-
lages they were assassinated or used as shields by the DRV/NLF.
By 1968, while neither side was making any apparent military progress
neither were they budging from their demands laid down, so long before, in
1965. There could be no movement toward a peace settlement until either the
United States, the DRV or both modified, in a basic manner, their long main-
tained positions which were, as they then stood, intrinsically at odds with
each other.
As late as 1 February 1968 the difficulty of coming to grips with the
essentials of negotiating the settlement of a war no one was winning was
illustrated in Secretary of Defense McNamara's Annual Report to Congress
when he summarized the Administration's Vietnam goals:
We do not seek North Vietnam's capitulation or even
the surrender of her regular Army units engaged in the
conflict..., we would be content to have them return
home. Neither do we seek the surrender of the Viet Cong
2






forces; we would be content to see them lay down
their arms... or move to the North... -*
To call for NVA elements to return to North Vietnam or for the NLF to "lay
down" their arms, when they had not been subjected to any shattering
military defeats but had not yet achieved any of the objectives they started
fighting for in the first place, is a fantastic demand. Equally unrealistic
has been the DRV demand that the U.S. unilaterally and unconditionally de-
escalate the war by permanently ceasing the bombing of North Vietnam and with-
drawing from South Vietnam without some corresponding DRV concessions.
The belligerents had not yet accepted the reality that they had, under
the ground rules of the war's conduct, been unable to bring sufficient
military and political pressure to bear against their opponents to force the
opponent to prefer negotiations and possible compromise of some elemental
issues at the conference table to certain compromise of all or most funda-
mental objectives if the conflict continued to a resolution on the battle-
field. Since that pressure has not been achieved by either side, each must
recognize that for negotiations to have even the slightest prospect of suc-
cess they must be prepared to modify some of the very basic objectives for
which they are fighting.
There occurred in the late Winter and early Spring of 1968 several monu-
mental events which set in motion the slow and painful journey toward peace
in Vietnam. The first of these events was the DRV/NLF Tet Offensive which
opened on the night of 31 January 1968. With a large number of ARVN







a massive, well planned and executed, country-wide offensive against the
major population centers throughout Vietnam.
Many of the U.S. and best ARVN units were deployed on interdiction
missions designed to prevent the Communists from using the truce period to
re-supply or reposition their units. As a result they were unable to
immediately enter the battle. In spite of later U.S. and RVN proclamations,
the Communists achieved at least tactical, if not strategic surprise through-
out the country. When coupled with the leave status of the ARVN and the
location of many of the U.S. and ARVN units which were on alert, the DRV/NLF
forces achieved spectacular initial success in the offensive. Within the
first few days of the DRV/NLF drive , sizeable segments of Saigon, Hue, the
Mekong Delta cities of My Tho, Ben Tre and Vinh Long and numerous other
4
Provincial and District capitols were in Communist Viands.
That they were eventually driven out with heavy losses is relatively
less significant than the monumental political setback which was incurred
by the US/RVN. The staunchest supporters of the GVN had been the city
dwellers. The Tet offensive caused widespread urban loss of faith in the GVN
ability to protect the cities.
The U.S. and ARVN initial reaction was one of dismay. After years of
hard fighting the enemy demonstrated it could still launch a devastating
offensive. The onslaught came at a time when the rural pacification program
4New York Times
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1-6 February 1968, various reports from the battle
fronts in South Vietnam.
There was of course heavy damage to the cities as a result of the
fierce fighting and the US/RVN air and artillery bombardment to dislodge the
attackers. The loss of civilian life was staggering as the urban population
was caught in the vicious cross fire between attackers and defenders.

77
was supposedly showing some signs of progress yet the post-mortem of the
offensive had revealed that large quantities of weapons had been stockpiled,
with the assistance of civilians, within the cities themselves.
On 12 March 1968 Senator Eugene McCarthy nominally representing anti-
war dissidents in America received a stunning 42% of the vote as a write-in
candidate against President Johnson, who received 44%, in the New Hampshire
Presidential Primary. Much more dramatically than any opinion poll the
primary demonstrated to the President that a large segment of the American
population judged his Vietnam policy as unsatisfactory.
Before the Tet Offensive, the Administration had attempted to force
concessions from Hanoi by upping the military ante and increasing the
military pressure both in North and South Vietnam. First a limited bombing
campaign and then a limited commitment of U.S. troops were tried. When un-
successful in forcing DRV/NLF concessions the bombing campaign and the com-
mitment of troops was expanded incrimentally until the U.S. had, by February
1968, committed over 520,000 troops and was engaged in a virtually unlimited
aerial assault on North Vietnam. (The only major targets not approved for
destruction were the wharves at Haiphong, the dike system which keeps the
Red River within its banks in the Delta area and the population of North
Vietnam as a specific target instead of incidental victims in the bombing of
military targets.) Complementing the in-country forces was a huge naval
commitment in the form of four aircraft carriers, dozens of destroyers,
several cruisers, a battleship and a host of support vessels. Based in
Thailand for use against North Vietnam was a large air fleet. (The use of
New York Times, 2 April 1968, p. 1.
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Thailand for raids against the DRV is certainly an act of war by Thailand
against North Vietnam establishing a causa belli.)
The strategy of incrementally increasing the military pressure to force
elemental changes in the DRV or NLF positions had, in a political sense,
been a failure. In spite of this massive effort the DRV/NLF attained the
capability to launch a paralyzing attack. In light of the Communist Tet
Offensive and the showing of Senator McCarthy, President Johnson set in
motion a fundamental policy review which was triggered by General
Westmoreland's request for 200,000 additional U.S. troops to cope with the
increased enemy activity. This policy review resulted in a basic shift in
American strategy. For the first time the United States would try to lure
the DRV, and through them the NLF, to the conference table with military
concessions instead of escalations.
On the 31st of March 1968 President Johnson announced, in a nation-wide
broadcast, that the U.S. was unilaterally suspending the air attacks and
naval bombardment of North Vietnam except the North Vietnamese Panhandle.
The President then called on Ho Chi Minn to respond in a favorable manner to
this American initiative:
Now, as in the past, the United States is ready to send
its representative to any forum, at any time to discuss
the means to bring this ugly business to an end... I call
upon Ho Chi Minn to respond positively and favorably to
this new step towards peace.
The President attempted to convey to the DRV that while the United
States was prepared to bear any hardship for the survival of liberty, which




8Ibid, 1 April 1968, p. 26.
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Of those to whom much is given; much is asked. I can
not say—no man could say— that no more will be asked
of us. Yet I believe. .. this generation of Americans
is willing to pay the price, bear any burden, bear any
hardship, help any friend, oppose any foe to assure the
the survival and the success of liberty .. .What we won
when all our people united must not now be lost in sus-
picion and distrust and selfishness and politics among
any of our people.
.
.Accordingly , I shall not seek and
will not accept the nomination of my party for the
Presidency.
9
The sincerity of the U.S. offer for peace could hardly have been established
in a more forceful manner. For President Johnson to bow out of the Presi-
dency, an office he had sought all his political life, was comparable to a
monarch abdicating for peace. At the same time, he tried to make it clear
that while anxious for peace the United States was not going to renege on
any promises or violate any trusts.
The DRV replied almost immediately to the President's initiative
declaring on 3 April 1968:
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
declares its readiness to appoint its representative
to contact the United States with a view to determining
the American side to the unconditional cessation of the
United States bombing raids and other acts of war...
Two days later the NLF endorsed the DRV decision to meet with the U.S. in
essentially bilateral negotiations to work out the conditions for full scale
discussions between the four belligerents.
The difficulty agreeing on a mutually satisfactory site for the negotia-
tions was not an unimportant matter. Both the DRV and the U.S. were trying





, 4 April 1968, p. 1.
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Vietnam War at the same table, there was hard bargaining with no gratis con-
cessions ahead. With the partial bombing campaign still being conducted
against North Vietnam the United States would attempt to extract concessions
from the DRV in return for the complete bombing halt that the DRV insisted
upon. When the discussions finally got started with the DRV in Paris they
almost immediately became deadlocked on the issue of the continuation of the
partial bombing campaign: North Vietnam insisting on an immediate, uncon-
ditional cessation while the U.S. demanded some equivalent DRV concessions
in return.
After months of fruitless talks with the DRV, the United States again
moved to break the impasse. In October 1968 the U.S. proposed to the DRV a
complete U.S. bombing halt based upon immediate expansion of the peace talks
to include the RVN , a discussion of political issues and an understanding
with the DRV/NLF that they would refrain from attacks on major southern
population centers:
The President simply could not maintain a cessation
of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it was very
promptly evident to him, to the American people and to
our Allies that it was indeed a step towards peace. If
there were abuses of the de-militarized zone, Viet Cong
or North Vietnamese attacks on cities or other populated
areas such as provincial capitols in South Vietnam or a
refusal by Hanoi authorities to enter promptly into serious
political discussions that included the elected government
of South Vietnam, a bombing halt simply could not be
sustained. ^
Following some counter proposals by the DRV concerning the prompt entry
into meaningful negotiations with the RVN the formula to on 21 October
12
Ibid
, 1 November 1968, p. 11, quoting an "authoritative source" which
was never denied by the U.S. but was almost immediately challenged by the




1968. The United States suspended all air and naval attacks against North
Vietnam effective on 1 November.
There again followed an agonizing delay while the DRV, RVN, and U.S.
haggled about the shape of the negotiating table; whether the NLF and RVN
would be seated as separate delegations and the order of presentation of
argument. However, compared to the fact that, at least in principle, the
belligerents had agreed to a negotiated settlement, these would appear on
the surface to be unimportant. In fact, they were extremely important. The
Communist negotiating technique is one of absolute rigidity on minor matters
attempting to force small concessions which establish a conciliatory attitude
which leads, to larger and more important concessions. Thus it was necessary
for all participants to demonstrate that they would not be bullied and were
immune to delay, badgering and bluster. Therefore each side resisted com-
promise on these procedural matters with the utmost of tenacity and the four
14
way negotiations id not begin until mid-January 1969.
Before moving on to consider the prospects for peace in Vietnam it is
proper at this juncture to quickly review the political parameters imposed by
the belligerent's perspective of the events outlined in Chapter One, as well
as more recent events. These parameters will, barring the unlikely military
defeat of one side or the other, establish the basic framework of any pos-
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The Democratic Republic of Vietnam
a. In 1954 under pressure from the Soviet Union and the CPR the DRV
agreed to a peace settlement that was less than satisfactory even though
their military forces were in a position to continue the fight to force a
more favorable solution. In return for their agreement the DRV received an
armistice which gave them control of less territory than they held before
the Agreement and a Document of dubious legal validity promising unification
elections. That the 1954 Agreement, which they were pressured to sign by
their ostensible allies, did not result in the assimilation of South Vietnam
or prevent the United States from propping up the Southern regime with money
and, in the end, armed force cannot fail to make the DRV more independent of
DPR and Soviet pressures today, after 15 years as the legal government of
North Vietnam than they were in 1954 when operating from a "capitol" hidden
under some remote jungle canopy.
b. The DRV is, as we have seen, determined to unify Vietnam under DRV
control. To accomplish this the DRV has provided the southern insurgent.?
with arms, munitions, leadership and direct armed assistance. To direct the
insurgency the NFLSN was formed and led by the People's Revolutionary Party
which is simply the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party. Since, perhaps
as early as 1961 but certainly since 1964, NVA units have been used in South
Vietnam in a conventional war of maneuver designed to annihilate the GVN.
The depth of this conviction is demonstrated by the DRV refusal to budge from
this determination to destroy the GVN in spite of massive casualties to NVA
elements in South Vietnam and the awesome air offensive unleashed against
North Vietnam by the U.S. Their fledgling industry was reduced to rubble;
bridges, railroad and motor transport, barge and ship traffic were by-in-
large destroyed and large segments of the residential districts adjacent to
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military targets were razed. Even discounting the human sacrifice, in
monetary terms alone the reconstruction of North Vietnam will be a gigantic
fiscal undertaking. Yet the DRV refused to quit the struggle which was
causing the tremendous devastation of their country and suffering of their
citizenry.
When one considers the stupendous sacrifices in material and human
suffering already born by the North Vietnamese it is inconceivable that they
will agree to any settlement not fulfilling at least part of their objective
of unifying Vietnam such as, perhaps, the establishment of a neutral govern-
ment in South Vietnam committed and bound by an enforcible international
agreement to the reunification of Vietnam on some long term but specified
time table.
c. To maintain even a semblance of control and influence with the NLF
after any settlement, not resulting in the unlikely event of unification,
the DRV must insure that the NLF receives ironclad, enforcible and absolute
guarantees against reprisals such as occurred, contrary to the 1954 Agree-
ment guarantees, under Diem's arbitrary and dictatorial rule in the mid and
late 1950' s. The NLF fear of reprisals after a long and bitter war marked
by ruthless killing by both the NLF and the RVN, may be of sufficient
magnitude to cause the NLF to continue the war alone if the DRV should agree
to any settlement not providing adequate protection against large scale,
deliberate reprisals.
d. The DRV sees in the United States policies relating to Vietnam a
sinister intransigence and basic hostility towards the DRV. Reinforcing
J. J. Zasloff, Origins of Insurgency in South Vietnam : Role of the
Southern Viet Minh (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation, 1965). This
theme is developed at length in this short Rand Memorandum.
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this view were the U.S. refusal to assent to the Final Declaration, encour-
agement to the State of Vietnam to refuse to participate in the proposed
1956 unification elections, the U.S. leadership in the organization of the
SEATO pact and the Protocol affecting South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and
finally U.S. military support of the RVN against the DRV/NLF. Particularly
alarming must have been the 1955 SEATO Protocol which guaranteed the
"independence" of South Vietnam even before the July 1956 deadline for the
reunification elections and in spite of the 1954 Conference admonition that
the demarcation was in no way to be considered a boundary. This view of the
United States, as a less than trustworthy nation, can be expected to con-
tribute to a DRV unwillingness to reach a negotiated settlement requiring the
good will and acquiescence of the U.S.
The National Front for the Liberation
of South Vietnam
a. Similar to the Soviet and Chinese pressure on the DRV in 1954, the
DRV forced the southern Vietminh to agree to a solution to the First Indo-
china War which resulted in the surrender of territories held by the southern
insurgents. In other words, the DRV signed away victories bought with
southern blood. Additionally, during the previous war the northern DRV
leadership appeared to take steps which were designed to prevent a successful
revolution in the South which might have posed the problem of a leadership
rivalry. Overly successful southern Vietminh commanders were, on occasion,
betrayed to the French Union Forces who then, conveniently, conducted the
16
executions.
Critchfield, The Long Charade
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In Vietnam there has traditionally been southern mistrust of northerners
and northern contempt of southerners. The DRV indifference to southern
objectives and, indeed, the apparent DRV view that the South is a tool to
be used for the benefit of the North, stimulated the deep-rooted and funda-
mental distrust by southerners of the DRV leadership. This basic difference
leads to the assumption that the NLF may not be as anxious for unification
as the DRV. This assumption is supported by the public utterances of the
NLF leadership which has, especially during the recent years, advocated the
independence of South Vietnam for a period of up to twenty years. For
instance, in an interview for L'Monde on 15 January 1967, the NLF repre-
sentative to the Soviet Union, Dang Quang Minh, said: "...the South
Vietnamese.
.
.want national independence, democracy, peace and neutrality...
unification will be done by stages, on the basis of the agreement of the
people of the two zones, without the adsorption of one by the other..."
This basic distrust of northerners, reinforced by recent historical
events will make the NLF most cautious of any DRV proposals during the
negotiations which are clearly not in the best interests of the NLF. Any
proposals which might be attractive only to the North, at the expense of the
South, can be expected to be rejected out-of-hand by the National Front for
the Liberation of South Vietnam.
b. As previously noted the NLF, because of past experiences under Diem
and the length and bitterness of the present war, will demand some very
concrete guarantees against reprisals in any settlement which might not
leave the NLF in de facto control of South Vietnam. The southern Vietminh
17
L' Monde (Paris), 16 January 1967.
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returned to their homes in 1954 with Geneva "guarantees" of freedom from
reprisals and the prospects of peaceful union with the North. That neither
of these guarantees were convertible in actuality can not help but to
influence the NLF position during the Paris negotiations. The southern
Vietminh view is probably that they won the First Indochina War and lost
the peace. They should be expected to attempt to prevent a recurrence of
that event.
c. While the NLF is nowhere strong enough to deny US/RVN access to
any area, substantial sections of South Vietnam are, in fact, governed by
the NLF. Even if the most recent US/RVN estimates of "secure" and "rela-
tively secure" villages are correct, which is improbable, at least twenty-
1 8
five percent of the rural population is not at all secure. U.S. estimates
rank seventy-five percent of the villages as secure or relatively secure
while the RVN figure is eighty-six percent. Controlling twenty-five percent
of the rural population and exercising at least partial control in "rela-
tively secure" areas translates, politically, to a powerful lever for forcing
concessions since the NLF must be expected to continue to fight rather than
surrender control of their territory if at least some of their fundamental
goals are not realized.
d. Past Communist experience with coalition governments which do not
leave the Communists in de facto control of the government will inhibit a
solution which envisions a true coalition government. The coalition govern-
ments which did not leave the control in Communist hands, such as formed in
China during the late 1920' s, resulted in disasters or near disasters for the
1 Q
New York Times, 1 February 1969, p. 12.
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indigenous Communists. In Vietnam, where the usual communist-anti-communist
bitterness has been deepened by years of vicious fighting and assassination
and there are in existence rival armies, the chances of the NLF entering a
true coalition are, therefore, remote.
The Republic of Vietnam
a. The ruling elite in South Vietnam is determined to maintain the
independence of South Vietnam under the present leadership. Since the NLF
is controlled by the People's Revolutionary Party which is, purportedly,
simply the southern wing of the Lao Dong Party it is difficult for the RVN
to view the NLF as anything except a vassal of the DRV and as such, a threat
to the independence of South Vietnam. In exchange for NLF participation in
southern political life the RVN will continue to insist on the severence of
NLF-DRV ties.
b. Given the RVN view that the war in South Vietnam is the result of
Northern inspiration, leadership and armed assistance, it is understandable
that Saigon tends to view concessions as rewards for aggression. In what is
essentially a political struggle, regardless of how many hundreds of
thousands of troops might be involved, concessions represent victories for
one side and defeat for the other. As such they may effect morale in
approximately the same manner as battlefield victories and defeats. Until
recently the political base of the GVN and the morale of the ARVN was so
shakey it is debatable whether the RVN could have survived any significant
concessions to the DRV/NLF. Even with the increased political stability and
confidence in South Vietnam, concessions to the DRV/NLF are not well
received. The GVN leadership has repeatedly declared that since US/RVN
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concessions do not produce favorable reciprocal action by the enemy, con-
cessions should be halted pending a change in NLF/DRV attitude.
c. Although almost defeated during the military and political crisis
of the mid-1960' s, the RVN, with U.S. assistance, has survived and apparently
grows stronger with the passage of time. It is therefore unlikely that the
GVN will be willing to concede in Paris what it has not lost in Vietnam.
This attitude was articulated by Vice President Ky following the announce-
ment that expanded peace talks would be held in Paris:
We are not the losers on the battlefields so there is
no reason for us to be at a disadvantage at the con-
ference. 1"
The United States
a. The United States is publically committed to the defense of South
Vietnam. The appearance of honestly fulfilling that commitment is viewed
by the U.S. as vital to the security of America. In 1969 it is pointless, in
terms of seeking a solution, to argue the legality or soundness of the
original commitment. The simple presence of over a half million U.S. troops
irrevocably links U.S. prestige to the war in Vietnam and its solution. The
question now, as President Nixon framed it, is:
We can have honest debate about whether we should have
entered the war. We can have honest debate about the
past conduct of the war. But the urgent question to-
day is what to do now that we are there, not whether we




The U.S. has built, since World War II, a global network of bilateral
and multilateral mutual assistance treaties designed primarily to contain
20
New York Times, 15 May 1969, p. 16.

89
the Soviet Union and, more recently, the CPR. The deterrent effect of those
treaties is based on the assumption, by friend and foe alike, that if called
upon to do so, the U.S. would provide treaty assistance. If in Vietnam the
U.S. gives even the appearance of reneging or not whole-heartedly fulfilling
a public commitment, the consequences to world-wide stability could be
disastrous. In Asia the tendency towards instability would be even more
pronounced. Virtually every non-Communist nation in Asia is dependent on
American protection to prevent encroachment on their sovereignty. The
21
abandonment in a time of stress and challenge, without having suffered a
military defeat, only a loss of will, of solemn pledges made by the Kennedy,
Johnson and Nixon Administrations, a treaty protocol and a Congressional
Resolution would have most far reaching and unpredictable reprecussions . At
a minimum all free Asian governments would have to re-examine their relation-
ships with the CPR and the U.S. in light of an American abandonment of an-
other free Asian government to subversion when the burden of honoring a
pledge became too heavy and unpopular.
Further, a U.S. withdrawal would vindicate the DRV and CPR advocacy of
wars of national liberation as the correct method of challenging the imperi-
alistic system maintained by the U.S. As such, all other non-Communist Asian
governments would either have to reach an understanding with the CPR or face
the threat of their own externally supported insurgencies, perhaps unassisted
by the U.S.
21
Abandonment might, in Asian eyes, include withdrawal of U.S. forces
without similar moves on the part of the DRV or forcing a Communist domi-
nated coalition of the RVN.
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Of cardinal importance is the affect the appearance of a U.S. abandon-
ment of South Vietnam to their Communist adversaries would have in Japan.
American hopes for Asian stability ride with Japan and the naive view that
U.S. and Japanese Asian interests will always be identical. At present
there are certain similarities which tend to make American and Japanese
Asian goals complementary. While there is a good deal of Japanese left wing
sniping at American Vietnamese Policy, the effect in Japan of a precipitous
U.S. withdrawal would be shattering. Presently protecting Japan from CPR
nuclear adventurism is the U.S. deterrent force committed, by the 1960
Japanese-American Security Treaty, to defend Japan. Should the U.S.
demonstrate in Vietnam it is unwilling to defend, at the price of several
tens of thousands of U.S. killed in action a country which has requested
U.S. protection and to which the U.S. had solemnly pledged that protection,
what grounds would Japan have to expect the U.S. to risk even the limited
22
Chinese nuclear strike to protect Japan? The consequences of a Japanese
loss of faith in U.S. protection is an unknown quantity of staggering pro-
portions. Already a fiscal and industrial super power, Japan could, almost
overnight, become the world's third military super power if the Japanese
leadership decided that such action was necessary to protect the Home
Islands. With the technological, industrial and economic base in Japan it
is unlikely that Japan armed with nuclear weapons would be another U.K. or
22
If even one Chinese missile reached an American urban target it would
kill more Americans in a miro-second than have died in eight years of fight-
ing in Vietnam. Actually since the Chinese are testing thermonuclear war-
heads a single such warhead reaching target might well kill more Americans
than have died in all of America's wars since the beginning of our history




CPR with a very limited strike capability. The world-wide implications of
a three way struggle are unfathomable but are, almost certainly, more
dangerous than the present East-West division.
While Japan is certainly capable of self-defense against any Asian
force, what would become of the less powerful nations if U.S. determination
to guarantee those governments were to be suspect? They would, at least,
have to reappraise their relationships with the U.S., USSR and, especially,
CPR in light of an American retreat from the burdens of Free Asian leader-
ship.
Although the precedent of simply walking away from a problem as if it
did not exist was set by Britain in Greece following World War II and by
the U.S. in China during the late 1940* s, the de-stabilizing influence of
such an action in Vietnam could upset the delicate world balance founded to
a large extent on the credibility of the American willingness to use armed
strength in response to treaty obligations to check the forceful expansion of
Communism into the so-called Free World. The balance is therefore tied
directly to such abstract terms as Duty, Honor and Trust. The absolute
necessity of maintaining the credibility of such concepts as they relate to
America and the world's belief that they are meaningful to the United States
was noted by President Nixon:
When we assumed the burden of helping defend South
Vietnam, millions of men, women and children placed
their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a
massacre that would shock and dismay everyone. . .who
values human life.
Abandoning the South Vietnamese. . .would jeapordize
more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten
our longer-term hopes for peace in the world. A
great trust cannot renege on its pledges. A great
nation must be worthy of trust.
When it comes to maintaining peace, prestige is
not an empty word... I speak rather of the respect that
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one nation has for another's integrity in defending
its principles and meeting its obligations.
If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam,
the cause of peace might not survive the damage that
would be done to other nation's confidence in our
reliability.^-*
Thus from the American point of view there can be no withdrawal from Vietnam
under pressure, with the nation's tail between its legs either in actuality
or in appearance. It is essential to U.S. security elsewhere that the
solution, above anything else, have the outward appearance of honor and
legitimacy.
b. The war in Vietnam is advertised by the DRV and the CPR as a test
case for the strategy of undermining Free World governments through people's
wars of national liberation. General Giap identified the significance of
the present conflict in Vietnam as that test case:
If the special warfare that the United States
are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it
can be defeated anywhere in the world. ^
With world-wide commitments providing treaty protection to Free World sovereign
nations—in many instances the treaties are operative in the case of internal
subversion— a U.S. objective then became to demonstrate that such wars of
25
national liberation were doomed to costly and painful failure.
c. The principle of self-determination is intrinsic to the present
American position. The reasoning in Washington and Saigon has, to date,
been that while the NLF operates as an armed political element, controlling
2
New York Times , 15 May 1969, p. 16.
24Quoted by General Maxwell Taylor during the General's prepared state-
ment before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February, 1966; The
Vietnam Hearings
,
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substantial segments of the population, there could be no freedom of choice
or freedom from terrorist influence in those areas controlled by the
insurgents. Therefore, an essential element of the US/RVN position is that
before being accepted into the political life in South Vietnam the NLF must
renounce violence and disarm:
We believe there should be an opportunity for full
participation in the political life of South Vietnam
by all political elements that are prepared to do so
without the use of force or intimidation. 26
d. The tremendous American troop strength in South Vietnam is a very
important negotiating lever. The NLF, CPR and DRV are all most anxious to
see the United States military presence reduced and withdrawn as soon as
possible. The DRV and the NLF because it thwarts their war objectives and
the CPR because it represents a direct threat to CPR security. The U.S. is
determined to convert this anxiety into some fundamental concessions and
mutual DRV action in return for any substantial U.S. withdrawals.
e. The failure of previous negotiated settlements in Indochina is
bound to exercise a profound effect in Washington. The inability of the
ICC to force DRV compliance with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements casts
considerable doubt on the ability of an international body to enforce a com-
plicated agreements between reluctant signatories violently opposed to each
other. Thus while calling for international supervision of any settlement
the Administration can not be unaware of the past DRV, or for that matter
U.S., disregard of basic elements of the previous agreements. The DRV un-
willingness even to permit International Red Cross inspection of POW camps
New York Times, 15 May 1969, p. 16.
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in North Vietnam is indicative of the DRV attitude towards supra-national
inspection bodies and infringement on DRV sovereignty. This DRV attitude
threatens the possibility of a settlement supervised by an international
body.
f. The continued DRV military activities in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
tends to confirm the American suspicions that the DRV is, in fact, attempt-
ing to establish North Vietnamese control over the entire Indochina Penin-
sula. Particularly inflammatory has been the NVA and DRV supported Pathet
Lao offensives, undertaken during July 1969, at a time when the NVA was
purportedly relaxing the pressure in South Vietnam.
Even the most cursory examination of the essential policy determinants
or objectives of the four belligerents reveals elemental differences on key
issues such as troop withdrawal, attitudes towards inspection and the
importance of such concepts as coalition government and self-determination.
The definition of terms used in the dialogue between the combatants is
an area fraught with the danger of misunderstanding. For instance, a coa-
lition government to most Americans connotes representation of the majority
of South Vietnamese political groupings, including the NLF, within an
armistice government. However, when the NLF and DRV refer to a coalition
government the exclusion of the present RVN leadership is assumed and any
27
possibility of RVN participation is denied. For their part the RVN, while
proclaiming their welcome to any party which excludes violence as a legitimate
political tool, forbids, at the penalty of jail sentences, even the use of
28
the word coalition to describe any possible post-war government.
27
R. A. Faulk, A Vietnam Settlement ; The View from Hanoi (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Center of International Studies, 1968) p. 11.
28New York Times, 9 June 1969, p. 1.
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The use of a relatively simple term such as foreign troops founders on
the shoals of multi-definitionalism. In the lexicon of Hanoi there are two
types of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam: puppet, meaning ARVN,
and Vietnamese, meaning Viet Cong and NVA. There can be no foreign
Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam since there is but one Vietnam. The
tenacity with which this is maintained is illustrated by the fact that the
DRV refuses to acknowledge the presence of NVA elements in South Vietnam in
spite of the fact that thousands are hela in RVN POW camps. Given this
DRV/NLF public view, the U.S. and RVN proposals for foreign, including NVA,
troop withdrwals are met with scorn and rejection. With the central war
goals of the various belligerents firmly in mind some parameters defining
any possible solution may be drawn. Perhaps the first and easiest to draw
are negative or at least definitions of what constitutes unlikely or impos-
sible developments.
The large scale presence of American combat elements precludes a DRV/
NLF military victory in South Vietnam. The unprecedented air mobility of
American units has denied the guerrillas of any secure base camp areas from
which to launch decisive offensives. Those offensives which have been
attempted have, in the military sense, been thwarted by the virtually un-
limited firepower immediately available to even the smallest U.S. infantry
patrol in contact with the Communists. As long as the United States remains
directly and centrally involved in the War the DRV and NLF simply lack the
military wherewithal to defeat the U.S. supported RVN.
If the NLF and DRV are incapable of defeating the forces supporting the
RVN, the U.S. and RVN appear, under the present ground rules, unable to
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defeat the anti-GVN forces. The domestic pressures in America to end or
at least deescalate the war are led by powerful men such as Senators
Fulbright, McGovern, Ted Kennedy, McCarthy and the late Bobby Kennedy. There
has been substantial grass root support for U.S. disengagement or, at least,
uneasiness over the current policies. Even if those opposing the war in
Vietnam do not compromise a majority of the American electorate, they con-
stitute a large and vocal segment of the society probably capable of
blocking any Administration attempts to increase U.S. troop strength in
South Vietnam or to reescalate the war against North Vietnam in an attempt
to stimulate movement at the peace conference.
Another factor militating against any U.S. attempt to resolve the war
through military channels is the North Vietnamese Army. The U.S. Air
Force's post-World War II Strategic Bombing Survey and America's more recent
experiences in strategic aerial assault indicate that it is virtually impos-
sible to bomb, without the use of nuclear weapons, a country into submission
and oblivion. Barring the use of nuclear persuaders the traditional method
of coercion used to force an unwilling and defiant nation to accept on bended
knee the desires of another is invasion and conquest. Yet a U.S. invasion
of North Vietnam is almost certainly foredoomed to failure and perhaps
disaster.
The very substantial portion of the People's Army of Vietnam uncommited
to the war in South Vietnam and the guerrilla heritage of the DRV would make
an invasion a most hazardous task. In a conventional war of maneuver the
force on the offensive normally requires a 3:1 manpower advantage to offset
the defense's advantage of fighting from prepared positions against troops
and vehicles assaulting in the open and the defense's capability, unless
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routed, of counter-attacking with reserves the exhausted assault troops.
In a counter-guerrilla situation the ratio has traditionally been figured
at 10:1 to permit simultaneous garrison guard of vital urban, logistic and
communication centers and offensive sweeps to destroy main force units.
Since the PAVN has at least 14 divisions with which to defend North
29
Vietnam ' almost any invasion force would require a minimum of 21 and a
30
maximum of 70 divisions. In other words, a minimum U.S. invasion force
would be composed of at least 315,000 combat troops plus hundreds of
thousands of support elements. Clearly this scale of effort is not only
politically out of the question but impossible without the mobilization of
all Ready Reserve Forces and months of preparation. Compounding an already
difficult proposition would be the patriotic spirits which would be raised
in defense of the fatherland invaded by a white, Occidental nation. The
results of any U.S. invasion of North Vietnam would tend towards the expan-
sion of a stalemated guerrilla war to include all of Vietnam rather than any
decisive campaign to end the war in South Vietnam.
The reaction of the CPR to any American action which clearly threatened
the political security of the DRV, such as an invasion, should, if Korea is
any example, be expected to be most violent. It is inconceivable that from
both an ideological and strategic point of view Peking could, without fight-
ing, acquiesce to a U.S. conquest of North Vietnam.
Therefore, except under the most extraordinary circumstances and extreme
provocation of the United States, a military solution may be excluded
29
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because: One, the DRV and NLF are incapable of defeating the RVN as long
as the U.S. continues to support that government and two, the U.S. is un-
willing, for a variety of political and strategic considerations, to change
the war's ground rules to permit the application of the overwhelming military
pressure to destroy North Vietnam and crush the NLF.
The heavy investment of political capital by the United States and
North Vietnam in their South Vietnamese proxies severely restricts their
public maneurvering room. The U.S. has ruled out a precipitous withdrawal
of American combat elements on the grounds that the resulting DRV supported
victory would be a de-stabilizing influence on the U.S. maintained world-
wide security system. American withdrawals must therefore be matched by
PAVN withdrawals yet for the DRV to publically agree to corresponding PAVN
withdrawals implies DRV acquiescence to U.S. pressure, the legitimacy of
the RVN as a nation and its right to request U.S. assistance and DRV abandon-
ment of the NLF to their fate in a move alarmingly similar to the 1954
Geneva Agreements. Each of these represent, for the DRV, politically un-
acceptable admissions which would probably result in the loss of all or most
influence which the DRV might retain within the NLF.
The inability, for political, ideological and strategic reasons, of the
United States and the DRV to publically acknowledge the legitimacy of the
fundamental aims of the other tend to make agreement impossible. For
instance, the U.S. demands for corresponding PAVN withdrawals which is, as
we have seen, not possible for the DRV to publically agree to. Similarly,
the United States feels incapable of complying with the DRV demand for U.S.
withdrawals without comparable PAVN moves. Yet the Nixon Administration is




The experiences of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements will tend to
make all parties most cautious of any settlement guaranteed by an inter-
national body or group of signatory nations. The blatant disregard by all
concerned parties and the complete inability of the supervisory commissions
to force compliance with the two previous international agreements on South-
east Asia illustrated the vast gulf between agreement and equality. Rather
than trusting enforcement of any forthcoming agreements to an international
body the belligerents will probably prefer to have' some more direct and
trustworthy mechanism to protect their vital interests such as their own
armies.
The mutually exclusive nature of what each belligerent considers
essential to its position almost precludes a public settlement to the war.
More likely is a series of secret agreements or understandings between the
belligerents in which each achieves some of its fundamental objectives. The
conclusion of secret understandings would permit each to maintain its public
stance on controversial issues for the benefit of domestic and foreign
audiences while in fact agreeing to something less than desired out of the
public eye. The war could then be de-escalated a step at a time. Since each
side might remain armed during the de-escalation process, if any party felt
its interests were being violated in contravention to the "understanding"
it would retain the option of re-escalating the conflict. This approach per-
mits the gradual acceptance by all parties of the realities of the compromise
understanding without forcing any to suddenly and publically forsake a long
maintained, at the cost of tens of thousands of lives, stance on the issues
central to the war.
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The United States must assume a most flexible posture during the
negotiations. It is well for the U.S. to remember that while the concepts
of Duty, Honor, Trust and Prestige are important to the United States, they
are, as well, critical to the DRV public position. The NLF Trusts North
Vietnam to continue to Honor its pledge and Duty to provide aid and
assistance to the insurgency. Because the DRV is, as is the United States
to the RVN, publically committed to the NLF, the North Vietnamese Presitge




In spite of the basic and fundamental differences between the belliger-
ents there are indications that the war is moving towards a negotiated
settlement. The first factor pushing the war in this direction is the grow-
ing ARVN proficiency. The Tet Offensive, although scoring spectacular
initial success, failed to achieve its objectives of triggering a general,
anti-GVN uprising or the capture of a single important city. The disposition
of U.S. troops on interdiction missions meant that the burden of fighting
during the first critical hours of the Communist Offensive fell on the ARVN
which succeeded in containing the DRV/NLF effort.
The intensity of the offensive can be viewed as a DRV/NLF victory be-
cause it demonstrated a capability to launch offensive operations despite
years of vigorous allied military activity. Equally important, however, was
the ARVN success first in containing and then, with U.S. help, defeating the
2
offensive producing a boost in ARVN self-confidence. This boost was given
a powerful stimulus from the National Assembly when on 9 April 1968 President
3
Thieu asked for and received authority to mobilize the nation. For the
expanded effort against the Communists the ARVN was to be increased by
4
100,000 and the local militia by an additional 94,000. To assist in the
mobilization and upgrading of the ARVN the U.S. started equipping the South
Vietnamese with the automatic m-16 rifle, additional artillery, transportation
helicopters, jet planes, patrol boats and assault boats and greatly expanding
~
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ARVN training and officer procurement programs.
The first results of these efforts was the "accelerated pacification"
program. The expanded militia permitted the release of the improved regular
ARVN units from static defense to offensive sweeps which in turn generated
more secure areas. In the enhanced security environment pacification teams
attempted to win the allegiance of the people by providing protection,
medical care, administering the new land reform program and educating the
peasants.
After all the years of fighting and volumes of advice ignored, the RVN
finally seems to have acknowledged that the NLF is waging a revolution
assisted by armed force. The correct counter-strategy is to wage a more suc-
cessful revolution rather than the counter-productive strategy of waging war
and hoping the political questions will sort themselves out while the
insurgency is crushed. Bombs, bullets and napalm kill people, not ideas.
An added benefit to waging a better revolution than the guerrilla is the
reliable intelligence voluntarily provided by the friendly villager which
translates into more effective counter-guerrilla operations and significantly
higher kill ratios.
While the claimed advances of the accelerated pacification program must
be viewed with some skepticism the fact remains that there has been a gradual
but significant change in RVN views of negotiations with and concessions to
the NLF and the inclusion of dissidents within the GVN. This general change
in attitude has corresponded with the gradual progress in the pacification
program. In April 1968, following the announcement of the U.S. and DRV
intentions to open negotiations President Thieu had to go to the National
Assembly to calm the alarmed members and assure them that the RVN would never
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talk with or recognize the NLF. At the same time Vice President Ky had
responded to a correspondent's question as to whether the GVN was prepared
to make concessions to the NLF to promote a peaceful settlement:
No mister!... Everyone speaks of justice and freedom.
Yet we are the victim of aggression and now peoples
ask us to make concessions.
.
.North Vietnam is large.
Let the Communists and those who support them go there
to live.-'
By February 1969, with the pacification program claiming 86% of the
villages either secure or relatively secure, the RVN position had been
modified considerably. Ky indicated that the RVN recognized the NLF as a
"reality" and was prepared to meet with their representative as soon as the
PAVN elements left South Vietnam:
If, after the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops
the Viet Cong want come and talk about a political
settlement we will talk with them... If Hanoi and
Washington can arrange the withdrawal of their
troops we can solve these problems ourselves.
'
This moderate position was further amended during March 1969. The RVN
is now reliably reported to be favoring a "Greek" type solution where a dis-
armed NLF is, with appropriate international guarantees, assimilated into the
Q
political landscape under some name other than the NLF. Thieu is now confi-
dent that the NLF could not gain power through a parliamentary maneuver since
it is unlikely that they could win over twenty seats out of the total of 199
9in the National Assembly. This growing political confidence in South Vietnam
6
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is illustrated by the fact that in spite of the DRV/NLF Spring 1969 Offensive
village elections were held throughout much of South Vietnam. To consolidate
his own political position President Thieu recently succeeded in forming a
political party made up of the ten largest political parties represented in
the National Assembly. Thus going hand-in-glove with the proven increase in
the ARVN's combat capabilities and pacification progress is the increasing
political assurance of the RVN in general and President Thieu in particular.
The first slight bending in the Communist position occurred at the 6
February 1969 Peace Conference meeting when the NLF chief negotiator hinted
at PAVN presence in South Vietnam when he said:
...in their justified fight, the 14 million South
Vietnamese benefit from the devoted aid of their 17
million brethern in the North... °
This may represent the first steps toward recognizing the large scale presence
of PAVN units within South Vietnam. This in turn could lead to a DRV-U.S.
agreement on mutual withdrawals.
Three months later Kiem (the chief NLF negotiator) made another slight
shift when, at the April 30 meeting of the Peace Conference, he said that
the NLF's Five Point program, which had heretofore been non-negotiable, were
now the "basis for discussion with other parties" in order to "make the
conference go forward." At the next session the NLF presented its new Ten
Point Peace Program for the solution of the war in Vietnam. While the program
is based on Hanoi's Four Points and the NLF's Five Points and contains most of
of the time-worn phrases calling for a U.S. withdrawal, it may represent a
10
Ibid, 22 February 1969, p. 2.
1:L
Ibid
, 1 Kay1969, p. 1.

105
significant step in the quest for peace. Of particular interest are points
3, 4, 5, 9, and 10:
3- ...The question of the Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam
shall be resolved by the Vietnamese parties themselves.
4-
. .
.They decide themselves the political regime of South Vietnam
through free and democratic general elections. .. a coalition
government.
.
.installed, reflecting national concord and the
broad union of all social strata.
5- ...During the period intervening between the restoration of
peace and. . .elections neither party shall impose its political
regime on the people of Vietnam.
.
.The political forces. .. that
stand for peace, independence and neutrality... will enter talks
to set up a provisional, coalition government.
9- To resolve the aftermath of war:
(A) The parties will negotiate the release of army men captured
in war.
(B) The U.S. government must bear full responsibility for the losses
and devastation it has caused. . .both zones.
10- The parties shall reach agreement on an international supervision
about the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the troops, military
personnel, arms and war material of the United States and the
other foreign countries of the American camp.-*-^
Points 3 and 4 seem to be concessions holding out the possibility of NVA with-
drawals and a coalition government. However, in point 5 "all social strata"
referred to in point 4 is defined as those groups standing for peace. Since,
in NLF jargon, the RVN definitely does not stand for peace, it would seem that
the RVN is to be excluded.
These definitions concerning the provisional government could well cause
13
a serious deadlock in the negotiations. The US /RVN insist on an RVN interim
government while the NLF demands a coalition government which by definition of
12
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its composition could not include the RVN. It is also important that the
international supervision called for in Point 10 is to supervise only the
U.S. and allied withdrawal from Vietnam. Taken as a whole the NLF's 10
Points are illustrative of the vast gulf separating the belligerents. To
suppose that after all these years the RVN or the U.S. would agree to a
Communist controlled government in South Vietnam is absurd. The question
then is to what extent the NLF and/or the DRV are willing to compromise on
NLF control of the South Vietnamese government and what role the present RVN
leadership would play in that government.
The usual Communist negotiating technique of presenting a list of
demands and then doggedly insisting on opposition concessions to meet those
demands while themselves remaining immune to reason or logic is under con-
siderable pressure in Paris and the jungles and paddies of Vietnam. The
DRV/NLF are facing an increasingly unpleasant military, political and diplo-
matic squeeze. During the first 3^ months of 1969 over 12,000 insurgents
14defected to the GVN which is the highest sustained rate of the war. The
ARVN morale and efficiency are rising with the receipt of modern U.S. equip-
ment. As the ARVN becomes more capable the possibility of the DRV/NLF
forcing the RVN to make greater concessions than those already made becomes
more remote and, in fact, the RVN position may drastically harden. The
accelerated pacification program is making political in-roads in the NLF rural
support.
In the diplomatic sphere both China and the Soviets are, for different
reasons, interested in a negotiated solution. Adding teeth to their quiet
14
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107
urging that the war in South Vietnam be de-escalated to achieve a U.S. with-
drawal and that it be fought by indigenous personnel with little or no out-
side support, the CPR has blockaded the rail shipment of Soviet war material
to the DRV. All of these developments threaten the military, political and
diplomatic base from which a policy of protracted negotiations designed to
wear down rather than compromise with the opposition can be sustained.
In the atmosphere of growing RVN political and military confidence and
competence, a long delay in reaching agreement may permanently jeopardize the
DRV and NLF negotiating foundation. It would therefore seem to be in the
best interests of the DRV and the NLF to agree to a settlement which will
remove America from the arena while preserving the political integrity of the
NLF. This would permit the NLF to move back to Phase I of the guerrilla
struggle without loss of face or political power to rebuild for a new attempt
on the RVN, minus U.S. support, at some future date. Such a maneuver would
insure the survival of the NLF, please the Soviets because the Chinese
strategy would not have been wholly satisfactory yet the NLF would not have
been annihilated and finally would satisfy the Chinese because it would remove
the U.S. from a position where it threatened the CPR without sacrificing the
NLF.
The major ingredient for peace has now been fulfilled: all the partici-
pants and major supporters want, for a variety of reasons, a negotiated
settlement. There is increasing military, political and diplomatic pressure on
the DRV and the NLF inhibiting the usual Communist negotiating techniques and
tending to force the DRV and NLF to seek a solution within a period of months
instead of years. However, since all interested parties have heavily invested
national political capital, prestige and honor in Vietnam, the negotiations
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must be conducted in secret. Whatever progress might be made during the
negotiations will, out of political necessity, be disguised in the rhetoric
and agonizing slowness of the apparent progress. None of the central parties
can publically acquiesce to the demands of any other. Therefore, agreements
will be reached, if at all, and accomplished in almost infinitesimal steps
without public acknowledgment of concessions which will become visible only
to the trained observer over an extended period as the war is permitted to
gradually de-escalate and fade from the public eye.
The approach, during these secret negotiations, most likely to result
in anything resembling peace lies in accommodating the NLF. Their leader-
ship has repeatedly emphasized that the independence and neutrality of South
Vietnam is an essential war objective in opposition to the DRV emphasis on
unification. This may be a tactical maneuver designed to establish a fic-
titious independent status for the NLF. However, the greatly strengthened,
politically and militarily, GVN can afford to be generous in dealing with the
NLF.
Alone the RVN is incapable of applying sufficient military pressure to
force major concessions from or to defeat the NLF. The U.S. is unwilling to
bear the burden of applying anything approaching that kind of military pres-
sure. However, by dramatically offering the NLF a real, significant and
truly legitimate role in South Vietnamese political life commensurate with
their not insignificant rural support while giving ironclad guarantees
against reprisals, the NLF could, at this time, be lured away from the DRV.
The DRV is under considerable pressure from the Soviets and the CPR to reach
a settlement or, at least, de-escalate the fighting to permit a face-saving
U.S. disengagement. The NLF must be aware of these pressures. Considering
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the DRV's demonstrated willing sacrifice of the southern Vietminh under USSR
and CPR pressure, at the conclusion of the First Indochina War, to reach a
settlement, a generous offer at this time might be well received by the NLF.
Without undue risk such an RVN offer could include:
a. NLF membership in an interim provisional government on a
national and provincial level during the period between an
armistice and national elections.
b. National elections, to determine national, provincial and
district government, based on universal sufferage. The
elections could be supervised by joint RVN-NLF inspection
teams with, if desired, international supervision.
c. Joint RVN-NLF armistice supervision teams to supervise the
armistice with the understanding that the NLF could remain
armed until after the elections but would, as would the ARVN
,
refrain from force, threat of force or terror to intimidate
voters. Once elections were held, the NLF would disarm and
be assimilated into the political and social landscape of
South Vietnam.
d. Joint RVN-NLF civil liberties supervision and inspection teams
to prevent the use of reprisals or terror following the
armistice and to guarantee the civil liberties of all South
Vietnamese.
e. Joint RVN-NLF inspection team with U.S., DRV and international
observers to supervise the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese
forces from South Vietnam.
Permitting the NLF to provisionally remain armed gives both the NLF and RVN
recourse to arms to force compliance if the joint inspection teams discover
violations which cannot be worked out peacefully under the armistice agreement.
While this may sound destabilizing, in actuality, it would have the opposite
effect since the violators would know that continuation of the violations would
lead to direct military action and therefore inhibit violations.
An international body has no recourse to force and to be of even limited
effectiveness must operate on the basis of consensus, with world opinion the
only bludgeon available to threaten violators. Thus rather than inhibiting,
the international guarantee encourages violation since it may, if its findings
are inconvenient, simply be ignored.
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The joint inspection teams could, with a provisionally armed NLF, there-
fore more adequately guarantee compliance with the agreement and protect the
rights of all of the South Vietnamese citizenry.
The one man, one vote concept inherent in such a plan, for the very
reason it would be attractive to 'the RVN, might be unsatisfactory to the NLF
since their military strength probably exceeds their political support.
Unfortunately, it is entirely possible the offer would not be well
received either because the NLF feels it can eventually gain control of South
Vietnam by relentlessly applying military and political pressure or because
the NLF is, in fact, a DRV vassal. The issues involved are so basic, so
fundamental that agreement is, at best, extremely difficult while, at worst,
impossible. The distrust and hatred born and nurtured in the flames of
battle do not make concessions on such issues as control of a provisional
government easy to give or, for that matter, easy to accept since neither
side is willing to consider that the concession was given in good faith,
rather than as a Trojan Horse.
The effort should, however, be made since a failure to reach agreement
soon could have most far-reaching and significant reprecussions. It is pos-
sible for the U.S. to make limited troop withdrawals as the ARVN gains in
proficiency. However, as long as the war continues at anything approaching
the present level of violence, large scale cuts in U.S. manpower are not
feasible unless the United States decides to abandon South Vietnam.
For the reasons already discussed, the U.S. will not abandon Vietnam.
But the President is now and will in the future come under increasingly heavy
fire to "do something about Vietnam." The recent Gallup Polls show only 19%
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of the American population believe that a continuation of the present fight
and negotiate policy is the best approach towards a solution. An over-
whelming 70% feel the negotiations are making no progress. A very sub-
stantial minority, 32%, favor a policy of greatly escalating the war to
bring it to a rapid military solution. While most Americans want to get
out of the quagmire in Vietnam, there is wide-spread opposition to uni-
lateral withdrawal.
Since the ARVN cannot carry all the combat load and the U.S. cannot
unilaterally withdraw without shattering its global system of mutual defense
pacts, it seems likely that the pressure to again resort to dangerous esca-
lation, as the vehicle for getting out of Vietnam, will grow. America has
traditionally been an impatient and violent nation. As the frustration
mounts, the 32% favoring escalation can be expected to rise significantly if
the negotiating deadlock is not soon broken.
Having so swiftly risen to a position as the pre-eminent world power,
assuming the mantle of defender of freedom, the nation has not yet learned to
bear all the trials and tribulations of greatness, to cope with small and
offensive countries . As a nation, America has not lost the innocent's
belief that all problems are soluble with either good will or, failing in
that, a devastating military assault.
Ibid
,
23 March 1969, p. 3. Next to those who responded "don't know,"
those favoring "withdrawal" comprised a sizable segment of those polled with
26%. However, since the question referring to withdrawal was not modified to
reflect any preference as the conditions under which withdrawal would take
place, the question appears to be misleading. For instance most Americans
are anxious to get the war over with so the troops can be withdrawn: how
many of the respondents would favor a withdrawal if it would result in a
Communist victory in Vietnam?
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As the Congressional elections approach the President will be subjected
to increasing pressure to set a national course leading to a resolution of
this war prior to November 1970. While it is presently unlikely that the
Nixon Administration will heed the call to escalate, the war should be
expected to continue to polarize and radicalize American domestic politics.
As Hanoi and the NLF continue to maintain their intransigent posture in Paris
while simultaneously mounting casualty-producing offensives in South Vietnam,
the process of polarization may carry over into the explosive international
environment. The pressure for a radical solution to the war may eventually
become irresistible. The DRV/NLF may be counting on a unilateral American
withdrawal as that radical solution. However, the opposite may be true.
On the other hand, Vietnam may represent America's loss of innocence
with the realization that some problems are not soluble but rather can be
made only more or less irritating, painful or dangerous. That realization
may lead America to the stoic's endurance of pain and frustration; specifi-
cally the pain and frustration that may accompany the realization that the
war in Vietnam is not likely to end suddenly or, perhaps, even soon. Rather
it will drift slowly through a fog of domestic and international uncertainty
towards some dim and unknown shore. The only certainty about the voyage is
the assurance that every point of the compass will shape a course through
danger and death with hope and determination the only buoys.

Appendix I
Many notable scholars of this period such as B. B. Fall, Jean Lacoutre,
Philippe Devillers, Viktor Bator and Joseph Buttinger agree that of the
three communist governments at the 1954 Geneva Conference the DRV was the
least inclined to compromise. Vietminh retreats from Geneva demands were
made only at the insistence of the USSR and the CPR. Although victorious,
the Vietminh had been roughly handled by the French Expeditionary Force in
the Spring of 1954 and needed peace in which to consolidate its gains. How-
ever, the Vietminh leadership believed total victory was within reach.
Therefore, compromise with the French was unnecessary since the French were
doomed. (Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam : A Dragon Embattled
,
p. 831) On the
other hand, both the Soviets and the Chinese were much more receptive to a
compromise. The prospects of large scale U.S. intervention were viewed with
alarm in both Moscow and Peking.
If the Americans entered the war the Chinese would again be tested by
the cruel dilemma so recently experienced in Korea. Either they would have
to watch an American destruction, physical and perhaps political, of a
friendly, communist buffer state adjacent to the Mainland or or intervene
militarily suffering enormous casualties while attempting to compensate, as
in Korea, with manpower the vastly superior American firepower.
Because of Indochina's geographical location the Soviets would be un-
able to exert military pressure directly in the theater of combat operations.
If the Geneva Conference failed and the U.S. intervened the Soviets would
be placed in a most awkward position. To relieve any American pressure in
Indochina, the Soviets could only increase tensions in Europe. However, the
specter of an aggressive and actively threatening USSR in Europe would
greatly enhance the possibility of general ratification of the European
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Defense Community then pending. The European unifying influence and the
EDC's attendant supra-national Army were earnestly opposed in Moscow.
Additionally, the United States, which had just exploded the world's first
operational thermonuclear weapon during an air drop test in the Pacific, had
an intercontinental nuclear delivery system capable of devastating the Soviet
heartland. The Soviets possessed neither an H-bomb nor a delivery system
capable of striking the American core region. These painful realities
meant that any Soviet attempts to "save" the DRV would have to be made out-
side the main theater of combat operations and at the greatest peril to the
vital security interests of the Soviet Union itself. However, to acquiesce
to an American destruction of the DRV would be a crushing political blow to
the Soviet image, carefully built and nurtured, as protector from U.S.
imperialism of their East European wards.
With the more global political outlooks of the Soviet Union and the CPR
and the grave threats to their own national security which would accompany
any U.S. military intervention in Indochina, it is not surprising that the
Soviet and Chinese sights were significantly lower at Geneva than those of the
DRV.
Further substantiating the thesis of Vietminh acquiescence to intense
Soviet and Chinese pressure for compromise were the comments of the top level
DRV leadership following the Conference. They openly complained of this
pressure forcing the DRV to accept a negotiated settlement less favorable





Chronology of Events in Vietnam
and Southeast Asia
note: Compiled mainly from The Committee on Foreign Relations, The United
States Senate, 91st Congess , First Session Report: Background







Ho Chi Minh proclaims the independence of Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.
France recognizes the DRV as a "free state within the
French Union."
French, through a series of misunderstandings, open
fire on Haiphong civilian population killing 6,000.
The First Indochina War begins as Vietminh Forces
attack French positions throughout Indochina.
1947
Last attempts at French-Vietminh reconciliation
efforts collapse.
1948
5 June Bao Dai, French High Commissioner Emile Bollert, and
Gen. Nguyen Van Xuan sign the Baie d'Along Agreement
to establish State of Vietnam with Dao Dai as chief





The Elysee Agreement, in the form of an exchange of
letters between Bao Dai and President Auriol of France,
outline the general principles affecting French-
Vietnam relations.
1950
Great Britain and the United States extend de jure
welcomes to Vietnam.
United States signs Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for indirect










United States signs agreement with Vietnam for direct
economic assistance.
Geneva Conference on Indochina. The delegates are
from Great Britain and the USSR, (joint chairman)
,
France, the United States, Communist China, Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam and the Vietminh regime. Agreements
are signed on July 20 and 21 and the main provisions
concerning Vietnam are that (1) Vietnam is to be par-
titioned along the 17 tn parallel into North and South
Vietnam, (2) regulations are imposed on foreign mili-
tary bases and personnel and on increased armaments,
(3) countrywide elections, leading to the reunifica-
tion of North and South Vietnam, are to be held by
July 20, 1956, and (4) an International Control Com-
mission (ICC) is to be established to supervise the
implementation of the agreements. The United States
and Vietnam are not signatories to the agreements.
The United States issues a unilateral declaration
stating that it (1) "will refrain from the threat or
the use of force to distrub" the Geneva agreements,
(2) "would view any renewal of the aggression in
violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave con-
cern and as seriously threatening international peace
and security," and (3) "shall continue to week to
achieve unity through free elections, supervised by
the UN to insure that they are conducted fairly."
Flow of almost one million refugees from North to
South Vietnam begins.
President Eisenhower sends a letter to Premier Diem of
South Vietnam stating that American assistance will be
given hereafter not through the French authorities, but
directly to the Government of South Vietnam. The letter
also states that the U.S. Government "expects this aid
will be met by. . .undertaking needed reforms."
1955
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) with
its protocol covering Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
comes into force.
Talks were scheduled to begin (according to Geneva
agreement) for the preparation of all-Vietnam elec-
tions to be held on July 20, 1956, to reunite the
country. The Government of South Vietnam rejects the
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North Vietnamese Government's invitation to discuss
the elections, on the grounds that in North Vietnam
the people would not be able to express their will
freely and that falsified votes in North Vietnam
could overrule the votes in South Vietnam.
1956
6 April Vietnam Government announces it will continue to co-
operate with the ICC and reiterates its position of
supporting Vietnam-wide elections at such time as con-
ditions in Communist North Vietnam permit genuinely
free voting.
1957
3 January International Control Commission reports that between
December 1955 and August 1956 neither North Vietnam
nor South Vietnam have been fulfilling their obliga-
tions under the 1954 Armistice Agreement.





Large Communist guerrilla band attacks plantation
north of Saigon, reflecting steady increase in Com-
munist armed activity in South Vietnam since mid- 1957.
Communist guerrillas attack Vietnamese military base
at Bien Hoa, killing and wounding several US MAAG
personnel.
10 July In Belgian Communist publication Fed Flag, Ho Chi Minn,
head of the North Vietnamese Communist regime, states
"we are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are
building it in only one part of the country, while in
the other part we still have to direct and bring to a
close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist
revolution."
1960
30 April An opposition group of 18, calling themselves the Com-
mittee for progress and Liberty, send letter to
President Diem demanding drastic economic, admini-
strative, and military reforms.
5 May United States announces that at the request of the







Assistance and Advisory Group will be increased by
the end of the year from 327 to 685 members.
President Eisenhower assures President Ngo Dinh Diem,
in a letter of good wishes on South Vietnam's fifth
anniversary, that "for so long as our strength can be
useful, the United States will continue to assist
Vietnam in the difficult yet hopeful struggle ahead."
Military coup attempt against President Diem's regime,
Loyalist troops enter the capitol and subdue the
rebels. According to press reports from Saigon, an
estimated 200 soldiers and civilians were killed
during the fighting.
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is
formed in South Vietnam.
1961
5 May President Kennedy declares at a press conference that
consideration is being given to the sue of U.S. forces,
if necessary, to help South Vietnam resist Communist
pressures. He declares that this will be one of the
subjects discussed during the forthcoming visit of
Vice President Johnson in South Vietnam.
16 November Following closely the recommendations in General
Taylor's report, President Kennedy (with the approval
of the National Security Council) decides to bolster
South Vietnam's military strength, but not to commit
U.S. combat forces at this time.





United States reorganizes its South Vietnam military
command, establishes new "U.S. Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam" under four-star Gen. Paul D. Harkins.
President Kennedy announces that at the request of the
Thai Government and "because of recent attacks in Laos
by Communist forces and the subsequent movement of
Communist military units toward the border of Thailand,"






Canadian and Indian members of the ICC find North
Vietnam guilty of subversion and covert aggression
against South Vietnam. The Polish delegation to the
Commission rejects the charge.
Declaration and protocol on the neutrality of Laos is
signed by 14-nation conference at Geneva.
United States completes the withdrawal of the 5,000





Riot erupts in northern city of Hue, former imperial







Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hue.
is swiftly imposed.
Martial law
Buddhist monk (Thich Quang Due) commits suicide by
burning himself to death with gasoline in front of the
Cambodian legation. Further aggravates religious
crisis involving South Vietnamese Buddhists.
Armed policemen used clubs against 1,000 Buddhists
protesting religious discrimination in front of a
pagoda in Saigon.
Martial law is proclaimed throughout South Vietnam by
President Diem after hundreds of armed police and
government troops raided the main Buddhist Xa Loi
pagoda in Saigon.
Times of Vietnam charges that U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency agents had planned a coup d'etat for
August 28 to overthrow President Diem.
Military coup (organized by the key generals of the
armed forces) against the Diem regime.
Military leaders in South Vietnam set up a provisional
Government headed by former Vice President Nguyen
Ngoc Tho (a Buddhist) as Premier. The Constitution
is suspended and the National Assembly dissolved.
Buddhists, students and other political prisoners
arrested by the former regime are released.
President John F. Kennedy is assassinated in Dallas,
Texas. His successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, affirms on
24 November the U.S. intention to continue its military
and economic support of South Vietnam's struggle






Secretary Rusk announces in news conference that "A
Vietnamese Army group seized in the delta area of
Vietnam some 300,000 rounds of small arms ammunition,
weapons like mortars, recoilless ammunition, made in
China" and that almost certainly Hanoi was primarily
responsible for their infiltration into South Vietnam,
U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara in a speech before
the House Armed Services Committee states that the
situation in South Vietnam "continues grave," but
that "the survival of an independent Government in
South Vietnam is so important to the security of
southeast Asia and to the free world that I can con-
ceive of no alternative other than to take all neces-
sary measures within our capability to prevent a
Communist victory." France establishes diplomatic










United States initiates reconnaissance flight over
Laos.
Secretary Rusk stating the choices in Vietnam, says:
"A third choice would be to expand the war. This can
be the result if the Communists persist in their
course of aggression."
United States announces that several T-28 fighter-
bombers have been sent to Laos.
Two U.S. reconnaissance planes are shot down by Pathet
Lao ground fire from the Plain of Jars.
USS Maddox is attacked in international waters off the
coast of North Vietnam by North Vietnamese tropedo
boats.
Destroyer C. Turner Joy and destroyer Maddox are
attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats.
United States sends reinforcements to Tonkin Bay area.
President Johnson's message to Congress; join resolu-
tion is introduced "To promote the maintenance of
international peace and security in Southeast Asia.
U.S. Congress approves southeast Asia resolution
(Senate vote, 88-2; House vote, 416-0). General Khanh





President Johnson signs southeast Asia resolution
into law (Public Law 88-408)
.
Terrorist bombing in Saigon kills 2 Americans and














South Korea sends 2,000 military advisors to South
Vietnam.
Communist guerrillas stage attack on U.S. outpost
U.S. planes strike targets in North Vietnam. U.S.
dependents evacuated from South Vietnam.
Vietcong blow up U.S. military billet at coastal city
of Quinhon, killing 23 soldiers.
Chinese Communists threaten to enter the war if
American troops enter North Vietnam.
North Vietnamese officials state negotiations would be
considered if American troops were withdrawn.
United States and South Vietnamese officials declare
that President Johnson has decided to open continuous
limited air strikes against North Vietnam in order to
bring about a negotiated settlement.
Secretary General U Thant proposes that the United
States, the USSR, Great Britain, France, Communist
China, and North and South Vietnam participate in a
preliminary conference.
United States rejects U Thant' s offer until North
Vietnam stops its aggression against South Vietnam.
Seventeen nonaligned nations meeting in Belgrade
appeal for immediate negotiations.
United States announces intention of sending several
thousand more troops to South Vietnam.
President Johnson, in a speech at Johns Hopkins
University stresses our willingness to negotiate, and
suggests a $1 billion aid program for southeast Asia.















The United States urges Hanoi to consider the plea
of 17 nonaligned nations for peace talks.
Two U.S. Marine battalions sent to Vietnam; first
combat units to be deployed to South Vietnam.
Red Chinese Chief of Staff calls for preparation for
atomic war. President Johnson declares that Peiping
prevents Hanoi from agreeing to talks.
United States resumes air attacks on North Vietnamese
targets.
Secretary McNamara announces new troop movements to
Vietnam which will bring total there to over 70,000.
The new South Vietnamese Government under Brig. Gen.
Nguyen Cao Ky announces a series of measures including
a formal state of war, extension of Saigon's curfew,
and price controls.
President Johnson in an address at ceremonies in San
Francisco commemorating the 20th anniversary of the
signing of the UN charter declares that "bilateral
diplomacy" for a peaceful settlement has "yielded no
results." He adds, " I now call upon this gathering
of the nations of the world to use all their influence,
individually and collectively, to bring to the table
those who seem determined to make war. We will sup-
port your efforts as we will support effective action
by an agent or agency of these United Nations."
American troops participate in their first major attack
of the Vietnamese war.
In a Voice of America broadcast Secretary of State Dean
Rusk says that on several occasions, the United States,
the United States, acting through an unnamed inter-
mediary, had asked Hanoi "what would be stopped if we
stopped the (aerial) bombing ...we've never had a
reply."
President Johnson declares in a press conference that
in Vietnam, "we committed our power and our honor and
that has been reaffirmed by three Presidents."
The United States begins a large-scale build-up of its
forces in South Vietnam.
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28 July U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg delivers a note to
Secretary General U Thant from President Johnson ask-
ing the UN to employ its "resources, energy, and
immense prestige" in finding ways "to halt aggression
and bring peace in Vietnam."
11 August The Soviet Union indicates, in an editorial, in the
Communist Party paper, Pravda, that it would have no
part of any American efforts to involve the UN in
Vietnam.
9 December Ho Chi Minh, in an interview with British journalist
Felix Greene, callas President Johnson's offer of un-
conditional talks "absolutely unacceptable."
15 December U.S. Air Force planes bomb and destroy a North
Vietnamese thermal power plant at Uongbi in the first




U.S. Government sources confirm a report that Ho Chi
Minh relayed an offer to hold talks leading to negoti-
ations through two private Italian intermediaries.
A North Vietnamese statement calls reports of Hanoi's
peace feelers "sheer groundless fabrications."
25 December Upon the expiration of the 30-hour cease-fire General
Westmoreland issues an order to United States and allied
troops to retain their defensive posture and not to fire
unless attacked.
26 December United States and South Vietnamese offensive operations
are resumed in the face of a resumption of heavy
Vietcong attacks; however, the suspension of air raids
on North Vietnam is continued.
1966
17 January Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., a U.S. Marine Corps com-
mandant, declares after returning from a 13-day tour
of southeast Asia: "you can kill every Vietcong and
North Vietnamese and still lose the war unless" the
Vietnamese villages are rehabilitated and reorganized,
20 February South Korea announces it will send an additional divi-
sion and a regiment to South Vietnam.
8 March Australia announces its intention of tripling its







Pauline Frederick, NBC reporter, quotes a Soviet
informant as stating that North Vietnam would be
willing to enter into peace negotiations, if the
United States would halt the bombing of the north.
The State Department reiterates previous warnings
that planes of Communist China or other nations
attacking allied aircraft over North Vietnam will be
pursued into the territory of their home "sanctuary"
if necessary.
The Defense Department announces that U.S. forces in
Vietnam will expand to 375,000 by the end of 1966 and
to 425,000 by the spring of 1967.
The United States is reported to be carrying out over




Secretary Rusk warns Hanoi against trying captured U.S.
pilots as war criminals.
North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Peiping and Prague
report that captured American pilots will go on trial
in Hanoi.
20 July At a news conference, President Johnson warns Hanoi
that the American people would regard war-crime trials
of American prisoners as "very revolting and repulsive"
and that they would "react accordingly." Pope Paul
calls on North Vietnam to accord American prisoners






In response to a cable from the President of CBS, Ho
Chi Minh declares there is "no trial in view" for
American prisoners. Speaking in Indianapolis, Presi-
dent Johnson says: "We are not going to run out on
South Vietnam.... However long it takes, we will per-
sist until the Communists end the fighting or negotiate
an honorable peace."
Former Vice President Nixon, in Saigon, suggests that
500,000 American troops are needed in Vietnam to
shorten the war.
Thailand's Premier officially opens the U.S. airbase at
U-Tapao, capable of handling B-52 bombers.
President Johnson says that a U.S. troop withdrawal from






U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Foy U. Kohler,
warns that an American blockade of North Vietnam
would raise the risk of a military confrontation with
the USSR.
North Vietnam rejects Secretary General Thant's appeal
for a mutual de escalation of the ground war but










U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam reaches 389,000.
U.S. battle deaths in Vietnam reach 6,644, while total
wounded reached 37,738.
1967
Thailand announces its intention to send troops to
Vietnam and begins to train a 2,400-man volunteer
regiment, which is expected to be sent in the summer
of 1967.
North Vietnam's chief diplomatic representative in
Western Europe states that if the United States will
"definitely and unconditionally" stop bombing his
country, Hanoi will "examine and study" proposals for
negotiations
.
North Vietnam's Foreign Minister asserts that "it is
only after the unconditional ending of the bombing and
other acts of war being carried out by the United
States against North Vietnam that there can be talks
between the two countries." He also reiterates that
Hanoi's four points provide the basis of a settlement.
A newly released Gallup Poll indicates that 67 percent
of the American people favor continuing the bombing of
North Vietnam.
U.S. officials announce plans to base B-52 bombers in
Thailand for use in Vietnam.
Senator Edward Brooke, upon his return from Southeast
Asis, shifts his position on Vietnam to one of general
support for administration policy. He expresses the
opinion that North Vietnam at present is not interested
in meaningful negotiations.
Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai, in an interview
published in several U.S. newspapers in May, warns that




Vietnam occurs which threatens China's "security."
Chou states that "Americans won't be allowed to
approach our borders." He reportedly states that
China would intervene if Hanoi was threatned with a
"sellout peace" arranged by the U.S. and the USSR.
In issuing his Memorial Day proclamation, President
Johnson calls on North Vietnam to help negotiate a
way "out of this bloody impasse."
20 June The United States formally expressed regret for
damages caused to the Soviet ship Turkestan on June 2
off the North Vietnamese port of Campha. The Depart-
ment of Defense on June 18 had conceded that fire from
U.S. planes aimed at anti-aircraft guns protecting
Campha may have struck the Turkestan. The U.S. note
added that every effort would be made to "insure that
such incidents do not occur." The United States had
earlier denied Soviet charges that American planes had
damaged the Soviet ship.
30 June Immediately following a Soviet charge that U.S. planes
had damaged the Russian merchant ship, Mikhail Frunze,
in Haiphong Harbor, the Defense Department acknow-
ledges that American bombs directed at an antiaircraft
site in the port area may have struck the vessel.
16 July The United States, in a diplomatic note made public
admits that U.S. planes may have bombed the Soviet ship,
Mikhail Frunze, in Haiphong Harbor on June 29 but warns
that foreign ships entering areas of hostilities run the
risk of sustaining damage.
12 August Premier Ky denies charges that his government has rigged
the coming elections and invites U.S. Congressmen to
observe them.
17 August President Johnson states during a White House ceremony
that South Vietnam's election campaign may not be "with-
out blemish" but that it represents a serious effort to
conduct "an open election in a nation under fire." He
also says that Generals Thieu and Ky "have given their
pledge that they will support the outcome of fair
elections whoever wins."
27 August Chief of State Thieu said he would meet with individual
members of the NLF to discuss problems but would not






South Vietnam's presidential elections take place.
Approximately 4.8 million voters participate— 81 per-
cent of the registered voters. General Thieu wins the
presidency, receiving about 35 percent of the vote.
Speaking to the UN General Assembly, Ambassador Goldber;
cites North Vietnam's failure to give a definite pledge
that it will enter meaningful negotiations if the




President Johnson declares in a speech at San Antonio
that the United States will stop the bombing of North
Vietnam "when this will lead promptly to productive
discussions. We would assume that while discussions
proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the
bombing cessation or limitation."
Speaking aboard the aircraft carrier Enterprise, Presi-
dent Johnson suggests that Vietnam peace talks take
place aboard a neutral ship in neutral waters.
Thailand's Cabinet gives final approval to the dispatch
of a full division— 10,000 to 12,000 men— to Vietnam.
The State Department acknowledges on November 20 that
the United States will provide Thailand with surface-
to-air missiles.
29 November North Vietnam's army newspaper predicts that American
and Communist forces will be embroiled in savage fight-
ing during the next few months.
20 December The Washington Post reports that the U.S. Government
is considering the use of South Vietnamese troops to
pursue the Vietcong into Cambodia and that, according
to South Vietnamese officers and American advisers,
Cambodian troops had fired across the border into
South Vietnam in support of Vietcong operations.
1968
30-31 January The Communists launch simultaneous attacks on major
South Vietnamese cities, including Saigon (January 31),
where they temporarily invade the grounds of the U.S.
Embassy. President Thieu announces a total cancel-
lation of the 36-hour Allied Tet truce.
31 January President Thieu declares martial law throughout South
Vietnam as the Communists continue their attacks on
Allied basis and major cities. U.S. officials in
Saigon state that the Communists had attacked more than
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half of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals plus
25 airfields.
6 February Dang Quang Minh, chief National Liberation Front
representative in Moscow, states that the NLF aim in
its latest attacks was to overthrow the Saigon govern-
ment.
10 March The New York Times and Washington Post report that the
Johnson administration is considering raising U.S.
troop strength in Vietnam by as much as 206,000. White
House Press Secretary Christian states on March 9 that
the President has received no specific requests from
American commanders concerning the sending of additional
U.S. forces.
31 March President Johnson announces that he has ordered U.S.
aircraft and naval vessels "to make no attacks on
North Vietnam except in the area north of the de-
militarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup
directly threatens allied forward positions and where
the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly
related to that threat." He states that the area
covered by the bombing pause includes 90 percent of
North Vietnam's population. He asserts that a com-
plete bombing halt could come "if our restraint is
matched by restraint in Hanoi." He calls on North
Vietnam to respond positively to the bombing halt by
agreeing to peace talks and states: "We assume that





President Thieu says that his government had agreed to
the partial U.S. bombing halt and warns "that if North
Vietnam does not respond with a corresponding good
will gesture, it will be hard for us to accept any
more good will gestures in the future." He adds that
South Vietnam should be strong enough by the end of
1968 to allow a gradual withdrawal of American troops.
North Vietnam offers to send representatives to meet
with U.S. representatives "with a view to determining
with the American side the unconditional cessation of
the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war
against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so that
talks may start."
Hanoi dispatches assert that on April 20-21 the Alli-
ance of National Democratic and Peace Forces met near
Saigon and issued a manifesto, stating that the
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Alliance "is prepared to enter into discussions with
the U.S. Government" but that the NLF "cannot be
absent from the settlement of any problem in South
Vietnam." The manifesto demanded that the United




President Johnson announces that the United States has
accepted a North Vietnamese offer to meet in Paris for
preliminary peace talks on May 10 or soon afterwards.
President Thieu signs South Vietnam's first general
mobilization law. He states that the South Vietnamese
Government "intends to take over more responsibility"
for the war and that it will draft 200,000 men by the
end of 1968 under the law.
9 July A South Vietnamese military spokesman announces that
ten members of the Alliance of National, Democratic,
and Peace Forces will be tried in absentia for advoc-
ating rebellion and neutralism—capital crimes in
South Vietnamese legal code. The ten include the
Alliance president Trinh Dinh Thao. The ten were
sentenced to death on July 12 by a five-man military
tribunal after a 23-minute trial.
27 August South Vietnam's President Thieu states that the recent
Communist attacks in South Vietnam were aimed at U.S.
public opinion and particularly at the Democratic
National Convention. On the subject of negotiations,
he says: "We will never talk to the Front. We are
willing to talk to Hanoi." With respect to Vietcong
participation in future elections, he declares: "I
would never accept any Communist to run in an elec-
tion in Vietnam. When we say one man, one vote, we
mean the vote would only be given to Vietnamese
citizens who deserve it."
31 October President Johnson announces that the United States will
cease "all air, naval, and artillery bombardment of
North Vietnam" as of 8 a.m. (Washington time), November
1.
4 November President Thieu states over South Vietnamese television
that: "In order to win victories at the negotiating
table, we should have victories on the battlefield.
We will only be able to force the enemy to accept our




11 December The U.S. mission in Saigon reports the most optimistic
statistics on pacification yet, claiming that 73.3
percent of the South Vietnamese population are living
in contested areas while the remaining 13.4 percent
are under Vietcong control.
1969
27 January Vice President Ky states that while he thought it is
"too soon" for private talks in Paris with "the other
side.... I don't see why we can't have contact with the
other side if they are willing." Ky says that such





President Nixon states at a news conference that the
subject of U.S. troop withdrawal from South Vietnam
was "high on the agenda of priorities, and that just
as soon as either the training program for South
Vietnamese forces and their capabilities, the progress
of the Paris peace talks "is in our interest and in
the interest of bringing progress in those talks."
The Vietcong high command orders its forces to "launch
new simultaneous attacks" and "increase military pres-
sure on all fronts" during the new year.
The Communists shell Saigon for the first time since
February 23, killing at least 10 civilians.
4 March President Nixon tells a news conference that the
administration was reviewing the Communist offensive
to determine whether the violation of the understand-
ing with Hanoi leading to the U.S. bombing halt of
October 31, 1968, was "so significant that it requires
action on our part." Declaring that the offensive had
failed to achieve its objectives, the President asserts
that the United States "will not tolerate" a continua-
tion of the attacks in violation of the understanding
and which "result in heavier casualties to our men."
He asserts that the United States "has a number of
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sense of nation in the peasants who have for centuries simply toiled
their small plots of land is investigated in depth.
J. J. Zasloff, Accommodation in South Vietnam (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand
Corporation, 1968). An excellent survey of the sociological, political
and traditional factors favoring an accommodation with the NLF as the
wisest course in any attempt to resolve the war. The author argues
that Vietnam has traditionally been divided by regions (Tonkin, Annam and
Cochinchina) and sub-regions (highlands and lowlands) and attempts to
unify regions or even sub-regions will be most difficult. Therefore, if
nothing else, these groupings would defeat any NLF political efforts to
control the entire country and, because of that fact, the NLF can be
assimilated into the Southern political landscape without undue danger.
R. K. White, Nobody Wanted War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1968)
A provocative inquiry into the courses leading to some of the world's
more recent tragedies with particular emphasis on the misunderstandings
which led to the present conflict in Vietnam. Rather than investigating
the diplomatic or factual events preceding the various conflicts the
author develops the thesis that miscalculations, misunderstandings and
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